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luce tua
teaching millennials

TUDENTS OFTEN SURPRISE THEIR TEACHERS.

S

Today's students are no exception. After a
few decades of fretting about student cynicism and apathy, educators are confronted with a
generation of students described variously as
"optimistic," "confident," and even "comfortable
with authority." This is the so-called "Millennia!"
Generation, which includes those born in the mid1980s and later. Every generation develops in
response to the conditions of the age and ends up
puzzling its elders. So, what has made the
"Millennials" into what they are? Obviously, the
existence of the Internet and other information
technologies is a factor. For today's students, the
world is available at their fingertips in a matter of
seconds. They plug a computer into a data port in
their dorm or log-on to a wireless signal while sitting in the quad and gain access to almost any
information in the world. This has created a different kind of student. With so much available,
Millennials have learned to consume information
and dispose of it rapidly. They can find so much
information on any given topic that, instead of
searching through an article or a book for the most
useful section, they rely primarily on a process of
eliminating articles by the hundreds until they
find the few that give them everything they need
in the most accessible form.
This skill at filtering is important in their personals lives as well. Millennials are bombarded
with white noise, some of it commercial, some of it
personal, some of it just plain noise. They have cell
phones at the ready to interrupt any conversation.
Most can't sit at a computer without turning on an
Instant Message program that will bombard them
with stunted salutations from distant friends and
families. To cope with these distractions, they
develop their own sorts of survival skills. They
learn how to rearrange the noise to their liking.
Instead of listening to whatever is playing on the
radio, Millennials download the songs they want
415 The Cresset
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to hear onto their iPods and slap on little white
headphones so that they don't have to hear anything else.
This is not meant as a lament for a lost generation. I leave that to others. In his last novel, I am
Charlotte Simmons, Tom Wolfe drew an ugly portrait of students on today's elite university campuses. In Wolfe's telling, Millennials are selfabsorbed and spoiled. Their college days are a
period of extended adolescence during which they
feed insatiable appetites for sex, drugs, and popularity. A curious lot they are not. Wolfe seems
appalled by a generation that has no noble passions, no compassion, and- perhaps worst of all
for Wolfe-no sense of style. These are not the students I have come to know. I like today's students.
It is true that they are an optimistic and confident
group. They have seen the world (if only through
their computer monitors), and they saw nothing of
which to be afraid. This untutored worldlinesseven if often na"ive-makes many of these students
eager to learn and open to new experiences. Yet
these students do present new challenges.
Among these challenges is the Millennials'
belief that they have seen it all. In some ways, they
have. Every sort of life-style is on display somewhere on one of thousands of television shows on
hundreds of cable channels. Any sort of ideological tract or tirade can be downloaded in a moment
from anywhere in the world. There is little mystery left in a world that is always available at the
end of your fingertips. The Millennials' world is
disenchanted-barren of surprise. "Been there.
Done that," is their mantra.
This leads to another, more serious problem.
When one is used to a world in which so much is
readily available, it becomes difficult to appreciate
things that are less immediately accessible. Our
students are great with information. They know
how to grab tiny pieces of the world and rearrange
them to suit their own preferences and purposes.

They are not so good with wisdom-with powerful minds who challenge them, with ideas that are
less useful than they are transformative.
Unfortunately, so much of what a university education can offer students is not something easily
and quickly achieved. I assign Plato's Republic
almost every semester. My strategy toward teaching this dialog is simple. I try to pique my students' interest in this difficult text by helping them
understand what is at stake. I can demonstrate
appropriate interpretive tools and help them to
ask the right questions, but I don't believe that I
can truly teach the Republic. At least, I cannot teach
it in the sense of condensing it into easily consumable sound bites. If my students want to learn this
dialogue, then they will have to spend hours
working through and testing its arguments on
their own. It is the kind of learning that requires
patience, focus, and discipline. There are no short
cuts. "Fine things are hard," said Socrates.
Perhaps I exaggerate the problem. A number of
my students have doggedly engaged even the most
difficult texts I have assigned. Maybe the problem
is not so new. No doubt, students of all generations
have preferred easy assignments to hard, but there
is also no doubt that Millennials live in a culture
that reinforces their worst tendencies. My students
too often remind me of the democratic souls that
Socrates describes in the Republic. They are charming, pleasant young men and women-tolerant
and uninhibited. They are curious in the sense that
they will try anything once. And they are so used
to having access to everything, that they seem
intent to try it all. They are curious about everything, serious about nothing.
Sometimes teachers should tailor their teaching methods to the tastes of a new generation, but
students also can benefit from a more counter-cultural approach. Our classrooms should not always
be models of the "Information Age" in which students are bombarded with streams of data from
multiple directions. Sometimes, they should be
models of a more patient, focused sort of learning.
In our classrooms, students should find a refuge
from the white noise that fills their world, as well
as a place where they are not allowed the benefit
of quick and easy Internet answers. We must
encourage our students' curiosity without promot-

ing the expectation that curiosity can always be
quickly satisfied. We must teach our students that
ideas cannot be rejected because they do not seem
immediately useful and accessible.
These are not easy tasks. Each teacher must
develop strategies suited to his or her own students and subject matter. In my own classes, I have
made a conscious decision to sacrifice breadth for
depth. I would rather draw my students more
deeply into engagement with one text than expose
them to three more. If someday, a former student
ever needs a quick summary of some philosopher's
argument, she will be able to find it on the Internet
much more easily than she will be able to remember anything from my class. My hope is to help my
students learn how to engage these kinds of arguments on their own, how to think patiently and
slowly through complex problems-or at least to
make them recognize the value in doing so.
Of course, the entire burden does not fall on
the student. We cannot make our students patient
learners by stamping our feet and demanding that
it be so. When asking students to do new and difficult things, teachers must have their students'
trust. Many of our students are unaccustomed to
looking for answers without finding them quickly,
and as a result they can be dismissive of intellectual tasks that require patience, concentration, and
memory. If they are going to learn to think this
way, they will have to trust the teachers who ask
them to do new and strange things. We earn this
trust by recognizing how difficult the task will be
for many of them and by having reasonable expectations. Our students must trust that we will not
embarrass them if they make mistakes and that we
will not reject reasonable arguments simply
because they differ from our own. Sometimes, we
earn this trust simply by being available and helpful. These are the most basic elements of good
teaching, but they are particularly important
today. If we earn this trust, we can show our students the value of a kind of thought that to them
seems useless and outdated. It is true that these
students have surprised us. Hopefully, we have
some surprises left for them. f

-JPO

correspondence

Dear Editor,
Congratulations on a job well done. Your first
issue augurs for an editorial tenure marked by
new voices and interesting articles. I found the
essays by von Heyking, Creech and Meilaender
(even though I disagree with his views) engaging,
balanced, and informative. Regrettably, none of
these virtues marked the column by Robert Benne.
To dismiss the problem of diversity as merely a
"phony" issue masking "liberal hegemony" constitutes partisan propaganda of the least enlightened sort. Can't we get beyond this refusal to
address the most pressing issues facing higher
education? Would Benne look suspiciously at the
thoughtful essay on ozone by Professor Morris
because the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in
the "hard sciences" is 7.6 to 1? The absurd notion
that "political liberalism reigns (my emphasis) in
most sections of academia" carries the false implication that "ideological homogeneity in the academy squelches the genuine discourse on great
issues." Instead of such baseless claims, The Cresset
and its readers deserve the thoughts and opinions
of writers deeply concerned with the real issues
confronting universities: the restriction of education to the brightest and the wealthiest; the freezing of salaries and benefits at a time of escalating
tuition; the disappearance of liberal arts traditions
in the face of increasing professionalization and
credentialism; the presentist bias within the disciplines themselves; the loss of federal support for
education; the continuing decline in proficiency in
mathematics, foreign languages, and other disciplines; the failure to address discrimination in hiring and recruitment of minorities; the ongoing
lack of employee benefits comparable to those of
business professionals; and so on. Whoever
addresses these issues in a serious and critical
spirit, be she conservative or liberal, will have my
attention. Let me conclude by saying that my irri617 The Cresset
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tation with Benne's article was provoked in part by
its contrast with the rest of the pieces in a fine
issue, one that promises to raise the journal to a
well-deserved prominence. I look forward to the
success of The Cresset under your editorship.
William Olmsted
Professor of Humanities in Christ College
Valparaiso, Indiana
Robert Benne replies:
I'm sorry that Professor Olmsted found my
column so lacking in the qualities he found in the
rest of the last issue of The Cresset. I plead guilty to
being unbalanced, since indeed I was making a
polemical point-that in all the talk about diversity several major kinds of diversity (political and
cultural) are conveniently left out of the discussion. Perhaps I was overly suspicious in suggesting those other kinds of diversity-race, gender,
sexual orientation- were used as camouflage for
liberal hegemony, but the effect of political and
cultural hegemony is the same. Genuine discourse
on many great issues-ecological, foreign policy,
cultural, judicial-is impeded. One voice does not
a dialogue make. Further, such hegemony filters
into many parts of the educational system, though
I would agree that many classes in the university
are not politicized.
On the same day that I received Professor
Olmsted's letter, I received an e-mail from a pretty
perceptive young Christian in his first year at a
large, nearby university. He writes: "It is amazing
to see how many classes are politicized as well,
usually from a Marxist perspective. I am
constantly bombarded with the propositions that
American society is grossly unjust, that our
Constitution and our founding are jokes, that capitalism is evil, that white males are the world's
oppressors, that Christianity is bigoted and homophobic as well as intellectual suicide, that George

W. Bush is on the same moral level as Hitler and
bin Laden, and that our country is a two-class system of a few wealthy oppressors and hordes of
people who can barely survive. In my freshman
seminar we were forced to take a 'diversity test' to
find out our level of tolerance. Most students were
labeled 'unconscious oppressors and bigots' and I
was chastised for being a member of an organization (Christian ministry group) that excludes other
belief systems."
That sounds pretty much like the complaints I
heard from a cross-section of students at one of
our Lutheran liberal arts colleges, about which I
wrote in my column. Perhaps Professor Olmsted is
deaf to these sorts of things because he enjoys the
homogeneity of the academy and doesn't want to

be disturbed by contrasting opinions of a political
and cultural sort.
I agree that many of the issues Professor
Olmsted lists are worthy of discussion, but I find it
curious that he can angrily shrug off the major
points I made. They are at least worthy of a counterargument with supporting data rather than an
easy dismissal. Concern about this issue is fast
becoming a national conversation that deserves
debate, not dismissal.

Robert Benne
Director of the Center for Religion and Society
Roanoke College
Salem, Virginia

Robert Maynard Hutchins,john Dewey,
and the nature of the liberal arts
Lisa Heldke
1936, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESIDENT
Robert Maynard Hutchins published a slim
volume entitled The Higher Learning in America.
In it, Hutchins argued that higher education had
fallen into incoherence, and was headed for
tragedy and destruction (his actual words were
"vocationalism, empiricism and disorder") unless
it turned from the path on which it had
embarked- a path violating both the spirit and the
letter of the liberal arts tradition (100). Hutchins
also proposed a means to avert this disaster; a
model of higher learning conceived as "the singleminded pursuit of the intellectual virtues" (32)
and of "truth for its own sake" (33).
When Hutchins wrote The Higher Learning, he
was thirty-seven years old and already had been
president of Chicago for seven years. Even after
seven years at the helm, the institution on which
he sought to leave his mark bore the unmistakable
stamp of another man, a man who had left the
institution when Hutchins was still in knee pants.
That man had gone on to Columbia University
where, some thirty years later, he was still teaching and publishing (voluminously) at the age of
seventy-seven. His ideas could not have been
more antithetical to Hutchins's-and they had
come to exert enormous influence on educational
theory in this country. While Hutchins argued that
truth "for its own sake" was a pure quantity that
must be dispensed in an atmosphere uncontaminated by vocational interests, empirical sciences,
or attention to current events, this philosopher
understood "knowledge for its own sake" to be
inextricably and valuably intertwined with "vocational knowledge," both within higher education
and in the larger society.
Thirty years after his departure from the
University of Chicago, philosopher John Dewey
was still a burr under Robert Maynard Hutchins's
saddle, still shaping curricular and pedagogical
thinking at that institution.

I
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When The Higher Learning was published,
Dewey, predictably, reviewed it. This was not
snide mean-spiritedness on Dewey's part.
Hutchins had written a high profile book about
higher education that attacked ideas clearly identifiable as Dewey's, or traceable to Dewey's influence. He wrote a measured review, concurring
that higher education was in a mess, but sharply
disagreeing with Hutchins's prescribed means for
cleaning up that mess. (To his credit, he never once
called Hutchins "young whippersnapper" or
"snotnose kid.") For a year, the two published
increasingly vituperative essays debating
Hutchins's proposals. Their debate simmered for
another eight years.
I dredge up the dispute between Dewey and
Hutchins because this very public episode in an
age-old debate about the nature of the liberal arts
bears striking, potentially fruitful similarities to
episodes in our own time. The debate over which
studies properly belong in-or legitimately could
be added to-the liberal arts is at least as old as liberal arts institutions-and probably as old as the
codification of the trivium and quadrivium themselves. In fact, one could argue that it is as old as
classical Athens. Plato worried about essentially
this matter in the Republic, as did Aristotle in his
Nichomachean Ethics. Indeed, both Hutchins and
Dewey appealed to tradition-particularly to the
ancients-in pleading their respective cases. But
their views of that tradition-and of the lessons to
take from it-differed significantly.
Hutchins emphasized the contents of the education proposed by the Greeks, but largely
ignored its context-the fact that this was education for a particularly constituted citizen of a particular kind of democracy, who must be "liberated" from particular forms of intellectual bondage.
In contrast, Dewey adopted the most general aims
of Greek education-namely, that education ought
to liberate students and also prepare them for citi-

emphasis on eternal truths, its distinction between
immediate and final ends, and its distinction
between liberal and servile arts.
Hutchins's arguments may sound familiar.
After all, he hardly represents the lunatic fringe. It
is not crazy to argue that the liberal arts are the
single-minded pursuit of knowledge for its own
sake. Hutchins simply elucidates a view of the liberal arts that is held (if not always explicitly) by
many contemporary "purist" defenders of the liberal arts. I hear echoes of Hutchins in my friend, a
Robert Maynard Hutchins: "truth for its own
1940s graduate of Smith College, who decided to
sake"
stop giving money to her alma mater because it
Hutchins conceives an unambiguous distinction between liberal learning (as he puts it, "knowinstituted an engineering degree-a degree she
ing why") and vocational learning ("knowing
regards as vulgarly vocational.
At my own institution (a liberal arts college
how"). Knowing why is the "pursuit of truth for
its own sake," while knowing how is merely "the
that offers, in addition to the expected courses of
preparation of men and women for their life
study in the humanities and sciences, majors in
finance, accounting, nursing,
work" (33). These aims are not
A
more
promising-and
education, and athletic training),
simply different from each other,
potentially liberatoryI hear, not infrequently, the harbut directly antagonistic to each
model
of
the
liberal
arts
rumphing complaint that various
other. To pursue truth requires
departments don't belong at this
one to do nothing less than abanarises when we begin by
don one's efforts to develop the understanding these aims- institution, because they're not
genuine parts of the liberal arts
roles that define our human
"knowing why" and
lives-worker, citizen, family
tradition. The problem? These
"knowing how" -not as
member, community participant
majors are too practical/vocationdiscrete
and
oppositional,
(33). Such "vocational" studies,
al/professional in their focus.
but as deeply, fruitfully,
along with endeavors like "body
While at least some of these
humanly intertwined.
building and character building,"
maligned departments can reply
"social graces and tricks of the
by claiming squatters' rights
(they've been here longer than some traditional
trade" (77), current events and even empirical sciences, prevent one from searching for knowledge
liberal arts departments, including my own), and
for its own sake. (The elimination of character
while many can also identify specific ways in
building is rather surprising. One might expect
which their curricula fulfill Gustavus Adolphus
Hutchins to subscribe to the widely-held view that
College's mission statement, it's nevertheless true
the liberal arts are centrally concerned with buildthat they won't be found on anyone's list of "true"
ing moral character-a view having its roots in
liberal arts disciplines. On a widely-held underAristotle.) Vocational efforts thwart the project of
standing of the liberal arts, the disciplines in that
liberal learning, either by failing to prioritize
tradition stand in diametric opposition to the
knowledge of the truth that is "everywhere the
vocational and the practical; they are "useless"same" (66), or by denying that such truth even
and proud of it. Hutchins unquestionably stands
exists.
on firm ground with his critique.
In both his critique of the current university
After hermetically sealing the liberal arts
and his proposal for reform, Hutchins hearkens
from all things vocational, Hutchins nevertheless
back to the Greeks, and seeks to develop a system
finds himself defending their study on the basis
of education that embodies what he understands
of their deep and long-lasting utility-in other
to be its virtues. He credits the Greek system of
words, their value as preparation for, well, for life
knowing for its centralizing of metaphysics, its
work and membership in the human community.
zenship. He recognized that, just as the Greeks
designed their education for a particular time and
place, so too must we. It will not do to adopt the
content of Greek education whole cloth, for they
and we understand liberation and citizenship in
some fundamentally different ways.
Perhaps we can find insights in the
Dewey/Hutchins exchange to guide our own work
as liberal artisans.

True, there is nothing strictly inconsistent about
Hutchins doing so. He is simply pointing out
that, while utility oughtn't be the aim of education, we can, fortuitously, achieve it by these
means, so isn't that a terrific bonus for your four
years of effort?
Nevertheless, while it is not logically inconsistent, Hutchins's admission of the vocational utility
of knowing for its own sake does point to the permeability of those two educational aims-and
thus to an alternative understanding of the liberal
arts tradition, an understanding that argues that
the division between the "vocational/practical"
and the "purely abstract/intellectual/theoretical"
is not nearly so sharp as some of its defenders
wish to claim. Advocates of this alternative perspective use very different criteria for deciding
which studies do and don't "belong" in a liberal
arts college-and come up with a rather different
understanding of what belonging means. A more
promising-and potentially liberatory-model of
the liberal arts arises when we begin by understanding these aims-"knowing why" and
"knowing how"- not as discrete and oppositional, but as deeply, fruitfully, humanly intertwined.
Enter John Dewey.

John Dewey: the instrumental and the consummatory
To elucidate Dewey's vision of the liberal arts,
I begin at a more general level, with his concept of
human knowing. Knowing for Dewey must be
understood as always emerging from, and
responding to, a particular context-a time, a
place, a problem, a situation. Knowing, furthermore, has both "instrumental" and "consummatory" facets-it aims at solving identifiable problems, and it is also potentially beautiful and worth
contemplating. Any kind of knowing is like this,
whether it be the study of recently-discovered
ancient texts or the study of recently-uncovered
ancient plumbing in your just-purchased house.
Plunge into any inquiry, and you will find yourself, at various points, pursuing the answer to very
practical questions ("why is there a drip in the living room ceiling?") and also contemplating
abstract, even profound matters that have no particular or immediate connection to any situation
presently at hand ("is the water stain on my ceil10 Ill The Cresset
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ing a work of art if its creation was accidental and
not intentional?").
My example is trivial; the point is not. The
human activity of knowing is a complex, indissoluble mesh of consummatory knowing "for its own
sake" and instrumental knowing, pursued for the
sake of accomplishing some practical, concrete, or
vocational aim. To attempt to saw, chisel, plow,
winnow, or otherwise divide the instrumental and
the consummatory into two conflictual endeavors,
as Hutchins does, is a supremely paradoxical act.
It is paradoxical because, upon making the division, one is then forced to tum around and explain
the apparent paradox that abstract understandings
regularly present themselves as useful solutions to
all sorts of ordinary, day-to-day, practical problems
we humans encounter. If we don't begin by dividing the instrumental from the consummatory, that
paradox never materializes.
Dewey believes that this division, which
Hutchins takes to be a foundational fact about the
nature of knowledge, is more properly understood as an artifact of history, a reflection of the
particular social organization of ancient Greek
society, in which sharp divisions separated
leisured citizens from those who served them.
This social division, Dewey suggests, lies at the
bottom of the Greek division between the instrumental and the consummatory. The liberal or
"free" arts stand in direct contrast to the servile
arts-those arts of making and doing that are the
exclusive purview of slaves, servants, wives, and
all those who are not free. Greek liberal education
aimed to develop those consummatory intellectual capacities taken to be ends in themselves. For
the Greeks, the employment of such intellectual
powers was necessarily the activity of leisure; it
was not to be taken up by someone whose life was
manual labor. Indeed, it was a mark of the citizen's
leisure-provided "courtesy" of the workers who
served him-that he could pursue this higher
order thinking. If we no longer adopt the Greek
social distinction between leisured citizens and
those who labor on their behalf, then we must also
question this epistemological distinction.
Though Dewey rejects the Greek distinction
between instrumental and consummatory, he nevertheless embraces certain of Aristotle's general
educational aims: that education ought to 1) fit

one for citizenship, and 2) liberate humans,
enabling us to attain to the highest, broadest level
of thinking, acting, and living possible in our
world. As I've already suggested, the world for
which we are being educated differs dramatically
from the one for which Plato and Aristotle conceived their education. Contemporary American
conceptions of the nature of citizenship differ
markedly from the Athenian model, on which the
manual labor of the many freed up some few
men-those called citizens-for lives of contemplation and reflection. So too does our understanding of liberation and its requirements differ
from the Greeks'. Because the vocation of citizenship and the liberation it requires are the very
goals at which Greek liberal education aimed, it
stands to reason that we must retool the Greek
model of education in light of our very different
conceptions of these aims.
In the remainder of this essay, I suggest two
preconditions upon which a Deweyan model of
the liberal arts will rest. First, while Dewey and
Aristotle agree that citizenship ought to be at the
center of our educational enterprise, their fundamental disagreements with respect to the meanings
of citizenship and leisure require that we significantly revise the Greek prescription for education-specifically, that we set aside the sharp division between liberal and servile arts. Second, we
must reconceive human liberation in light of our
particular context. A conception of liberation cannot be generic, but must address the fact that
humans are prevented from intellectual flourishing in ways that are very particular to the societies
they inhabit. It won't do for us to adopt whole
cloth an understanding of liberation designed to
free the intellectual capacities of the Greek citizen.
citizenship: different concepts for different contexts
I've suggested that, when we embrace the
Greek tradition out of which the liberal arts grew,
we must also attend to the principles and presuppositions upon which it rested-including the
social and political presumptions. Dewey's model
of liberal learning does so. As a result, he takes
from the Greeks a commitment to liberatory education for citizenship, but rejects those aspects of
Greek education and Greek society that speak par-

ticularly to Greek conceptions of citizenship and
liberation-and that fly in the face of his contemporary concept of democratic citizenship.
One important difference between Dewey and
the Greeks lies in the fact that citizenship is no
longer a full time occupation for most citizens of
contemporary democracies, as it was in the
democracy of which Plato wrote. Our democracies
are not structured to require such a level of participation, and most of us don't have the wherewithal to make citizenship our job even if we
wanted to. Our concept of liberal arts education
must address the fact that, unlike those Athenian
citizens, we are being educated for a world in
which we are citizens, but also paid workers and
home-keepers. In other terms, it must incorporate
both instrumental and consummatory knowing.
In one respect, such a move represents a sharp
departure from the Greek model. In mingling
instrumental and consummatory knowing-the
"practical" and the "for its own sake" -it mixes
the work of citizen and slave in a manner Plato
would find entirely unacceptable. (Hutchins, of
course, also refuses this mixing; thus does he reject
the suggestion that the "practical" could have any
place in the liberal arts.) In another crucial respect,
however, Dewey's model embodies the very spirit
of Greek education. After all, Greek liberal education was deeply vocational. It trained students for
the vocation of citizenship. Dewey's model
embraces the Greek emphasis on education for citizens, but recognizes that the contemporary vocation of citizenship requires us to mix instrumental
and consummatory knowing. A pure "for its own
sake" education won't do the job for us (as it
allegedly would have for a Greek citizen).
For Dewey, the interrelationship between
vocational and liberal learning rests upon a fundamental epistemological relationship between the
the practical and the theoretical. As he puts the
matter, "theory, properly understood, [has] a practical value and practice an intellectual function
and content" ("Theory and Practice," 354-55). This
recognition, in tum, leads him to assert that there
can be no sharp division between the vocational
and the liberal-between work aimed at fulfilling
basic human needs and that aimed at the highest
intellectual achievements of which humans are
capable.

In short, once we attend to the different conceptions of Greek and contemporary conceptions
of citizenship, we must embrace a different understanding of the relationship between "pure" and
"instrumental" knowing-a difference that necessarily has an impact upon our understanding of
the liberal arts.
In a society in which most all citizens also
work at paying jobs, we need a distinctly "unGreek" sense of vocation that integrates these
activities and acknowledges their roles in citizens'
public lives. It would be the height of insanity to
adopt a model of education that fitted one well for
the life of a well-placed Athenian citizen-a model
focused entirely on "knowledge for its own sake."
It would also be the height of stupidity to relegate
mountains of workers to intellectual ignominy
because they are "mere" laborers. We need a
Deweyan sense of vocation that sees the two goals
of education-the "for its own sake" and the
"practical" -as intertwined.
A Deweyan understanding of the vocation of
citizenship requires us to challenge the notion that
the free citizen exercises the highest form of freedom when engaged in pure contemplation. In a
society such as ours, why would this be the highest goal? While a liberal arts education ought to
foster the highest level of thinking of which
humans are capable, abstract contemplation
undertaken at leisure may not (always, necessarily) constitute that highest level. The consummatory and contemplative might always be a component
of our highest reasoning, but it won't be the component that makes that reasoning the highest
human achievement.
In our world, the distinction between labor
and leisure-so sharp in the Athenian vision, and
so implicated in the whole understanding of what
liberal education is-loses its edges. Indeed, it
loses its descriptive usefulness altogether in many
contexts and becomes a downright hindrance.
What does become-what should become-of the
Greek veneration of knowledge "for its own sake"
in a context in which the definitions of labor and
leisure are much more interdependent? We
defenders of the liberal arts tend to continue to
venerate the notion of knowledge for its own
sake- and to police the borders of our venues of
"useless knowledge," to make sure no one is
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doing anything to make it practical and thereby
sullying it. Some advocates of the liberal arts venerate this "good for nothing" aspect of the tradition above all other aspects.
But from Dewey's perspective, a liberal arts
education cannot afford to ignore the fact that
labor and leisure, in our world, are deeply intertwined. As Dewey puts it in Democracy and
Education:
While the distinction [between labor and
leisure] is often thought to be intrinsic and
absolute, it is really historical and social. It
originated, so far as conscious formulation
is concerned, in Greece, and was based
upon the fact that the truly human life was
lived only by a few who subsisted upon
the results of the labor of others. The problem of education in a democratic society is
to do away with the dualism and to construct a course of studies which makes
thought a guide of free practice for all and
which makes leisure a reward of accepting
responsibility for service, rather than a
state of exemption from it (270).
Perhaps a liberal arts education has a particular obligation to draw our eyes always higher, to
the most abstract of our vocations-namely, to be
human-but that occupation itself is in the end
also always the most supremely practical one.
Thus, it is "higher" not in the sense of being purer,
but in the sense of being more important, and
more universally important. But part of its importance lies precisely in its being so very "practical,"
so relevant to the practices of our everyday lives.
the liberal arts as liberating
The second element of this Deweyan alternative addresses the sense in which the liberal arts
are liberating. While Greek education sought to
liberate its citizens by freeing them from the twin
dangers of ignorance and prejudice, a Deweyan
conception must address our much different contemporary understanding of human liberation.
What becomes of the old link between education and citizenship in contemporary democracies,
in which invidious, hierarchical restrictions on citizenship have slowly, incrementally fallen away?

Freedom and citizenship, in Athens, were conceived in relation to slavery and servitude. Dewey
argues that this social distinction between the contemplative life of the free man and the manual
work of the laborer who supported him became
reified as a division "between a liberal education,
having to do with the .. .life ... devoted to knowing
for its own sake, and a useful, practical training for
mechanical occupations, devoid of intellectual and
aesthetic content" (Democracy and Education, 270).
Such a division made sense in the Athenian
democracy, where citizens could devote themselves to intellectual pursuits, secure in the knowledge that someone-someone prevented by birth
from being a citizen- was taking care of dinner.
Dinner-makers needed all and only practical training in dinner making; citizens needed education
liberating them from ignorance and prejudice,
preparing them for abstract thought at the highest
level.
But how does such a model translate to a contemporary democracy such as the United States, a
democracy that rejects, at least in principle, the
distinction between free citizens and dinner-makers? What happens to the liberatory aims of liberal education, when we reject the very notion of
inherent servitude and the concept of freedom
that rests on it? Dewey asserts that we must
change the very nature of the education, such that
it does not encode the division between
elite/leisure citizenship and brute/servile labor in
the first place. The lives and work of citizens in the
democracy to which we aspire would, ideally, be
those of thoughtful dinner-makers, characterized
by modes of knowing in which contemplation
informs practical action, and action guides and
grounds contemplation.
Everyone in such a democracy would need
access to education that would prepare them to
live lives of thoughtful practice. Or, as Dewey
more eloquently puts the matter, "The present
function of the liberal arts college, in my belief, is
to use the resources put at our disposal alike by
humane literature, by science, by subjects that
have a vocational bearing, so as to secure ability to
appraise the needs and issues of the world in
which we live. Such an education would be liberating not in spite of the fact that it departs widely
from the seven liberal arts of the medieval period,

but just because it would do for the contemporary
world what those arts tried to do for the world in
which they took form" ("The Problem of the
Liberal Arts College," 280).
What, then, becomes of the liberal arts in a
Deweyan picture? What is left of Hutchins's tradition, of pure knowledge that gets thrown into the
hurly burly of everyday life where it is forced to
try to concentrate while vocational knowing has
its radio cranked up too loud? Something very
important-something that has in fact lain at the
heart of liberal learning since its germination in
ancient Athens. What remains when we reunite
knowing how and knowing that, is the recognition
that a liberal arts education ought to liberate us,
and enable us to contribute to the liberation of others. I can think of no greater wish for students of
the liberal arts than that they depart their undergraduate institutions as skilled "liberal artisans,"
prepared to continue their inquiries wherever they
might take them, but always attentive to the ways,
large and small, that their work as thoughtful
practitioners might contribute to the liberation of
others.f
Lisa Heldke is Professor of Philosophy at Gustavus
Adolphus College. This essay is based on remarks made
to the Gustavus Adolphus College Commencement
Exercises held on 29 May 2005 and is part of the
author's ongoing exploration of various facets of liberal
arts education motivated by her experiences at
Gustavus Adolphus College.
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after arson

Gary Fincke

T

HE SOFT THUD ABOVE ME MIGHT BE THE CAT, BUT

I know it is my son placing the barbells on
the carpet. Derek works at the weights in a
way that makes me worry it is hopeless. On the
first night he tried to lift, he struggled to push just
the empty bar over his head.
Now, without walking upstairs to check, I
know there are two small doughnuts, two and one
half pounds each, he presses ten times. He has
asked for a bench; he has rummaged through the
medicine chest for talcum powder, equating his
efforts with the delicate needs of a billiards expert.
These workouts sustain his faith in growth.
Only one boy in his class is smaller. Derek understands heredity, and he is frustrated by the disparity between our heights.
I have reminded him about favorable odds
and time. He finishes three sets and starts down
the steps to check for results in a mirror by the side
door. When he sees I am watching, he turns his
back to the glass. "No more 'Wimp,"' he says. "Or
'beanpole.' I'll ring the bell this summer when the
carnival comes to the Rotary field."
I tell him there's a secret to the carnival's test of
strength, that the game he's asked me to try three
summers in a row is rigged. "The wire that the
weight's on is slack," I say. "No matter how hard
you swing the hammer, the weight won't rise all
the way to the bell."
Derek shakes his head and recounts the number of bells rung by older boys and fathers, unlike
me, who are willing to test themselves. "The carnival guy always takes the slack out for a swing or
two," I explain. "He makes sure somebody rings
the bell occasionally, or else nobody else will play
after a while." Derek thinks for a second. "You're
just embarrassed," he finally replies.
At the end of one of those nights when I return
horne late, my wife is waiting for me with an
expression of crisis stitched onto her face. Liz is
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otherwise unmarked, so I expect to hear about my
mother's heart or splints applied to Derek or one
of our other two children.
This time I am wrong. It is Derek, all right, but
instead of a doctor, a policeman. What does a boy
just turned eleven have to do to be detained for
questioning? In a small town like ours, not much,
but this is serious, Liz insists, a fire in a public rest
room, the near-catastrophic spread of flames
through a community theater.
Or something close to that. Paper towels had
been lit. They had flared, according to what Liz
has been told, threatening the brittle wooden walls
of the converted bam, but Derek and the theater
were still standing. Nevertheless, a confrontation
was waiting for me in the theater office, and I was
expected to drive back across town to meet it.
Derek claims, Liz says, that he had been only
an accidental witness, standing in the rest room
when another boy had tried to prove himself with
matches. After I ask why I am needed then, Liz
shrugs.
When I arrive, Derek is sitting across a table
from a policeman who simply nods when I enter. I
figure him at once for a tyrant or a fool. SELINSGROVE SEALS is printed in white, block letters on
the front of the red cap Derek wears. I check off a
series of hard-edged possible responses to the stupidity of what I anticipate is about to happen.
"Tell me what happened while your father listens," the policeman says.
There were long pauses in the rehearsal,
Derek explains. His part, as well as the other boy's,
was small, and they had time to fill. When he
watched the other boy light the towels, it had
seemed like a performance, something he was
expected to watch. He had not even helped throw
water when the towel roll opened up across the
floor, flames traveling like thick thread. Even
when it was over, it still seemed like the other
boy's role, and Derek hadn't said anything to any-

body because nothing looked to him like it was
damaged.
Except, I think, now Derek is accused because
he expects everyone to be truthful and doesn't
understand the word-against-word dilemma of
investigation. I look to the policeman to see how
he's interpreting, but instead of saying anything,
he nods again and leaves the room.
Sometimes I am surprised by things.
Sometimes there are moments when the world is
pliable enough for hope. When the policeman
returns, he is pleasant and articulate. Derek is
believed. The other boy has lied so badly he could
do nothing, eventually, but confess.
"It's because you had a coat and tie on," Liz
says when we get home. "Being dressed like that
at 10:30 at night impresses the police." Derek
twirls his hat on one finger, blurring the stylized
blue seal below the white letters. A couple of revolutions and it flies off into the centerpiece of
dried flowers.
"Everything is going soft on this planet," the
policeman had said while Derek was retrieving his
jacket. "You need to keep a watchdog now just to
keep from sinking into the world."
"We have a cat," I had said, and he had looked
quizzically at me. He had laughed, too, although a
beat was missed. The hat with the aggressive blue
seal displaces the flower arrangement. "He's still
in the play," I say. "The other boy is being
replaced."
"On such short notice?"
Derek reaches out to pull the hat free. He
begins to twirl it again.
"It doesn't take DeNiro. Somebody can learn it
in a few days."
This time the hat lands by my feet. I pick it up
in a way that keeps Derek from asking for it back.
At breakfast, before his brother and sister
come downstairs, Derek explains the urgency of
his recurring dream. It is my fault, Liz reminds
me, that he has it.
He is running from the pods. All of us have
changed, invaded by aliens. Beginning with the
remake seen more than two years before and ending with the original watched last month, Derek
has sat through both versions of Invasion of the

Body Snatchers.

After watching the remake, he'd gone to sleep,
as usual, with his Darth Vader punching bag-one
of those tall, weighted balloons that sways and
bounces and always returns to upright-standing
beside his bed. An hour later he'd woken to the
certainty of an attack by the pods. A life-size one
stood near his face.
"Am I changed?" he had screamed. "Am I
changed?"
I had tried to reason with him. I had turned on
the light to show him Vader's plastic face.
"You're pretending," he had said. "You're a
pod man. The real you is in the garbage."
Vader had to be deflated. A night light had
been found in a drawer. "Eight years-old," Liz had
said, "and you've given him a changeling complex."
The pods have returned several times a year
since then, and his horror stories, when I try to
extract them, break off in him like ticks. I imagine
holding some kind of medicinal flame to each of
them. I imagine his watching the original film
when he is eleven will show him it is time to stop
worrying. Instead, I listen, this time, to his revelation that everyone who is not real has a tiny red
mark behind his ears. After I pour the orange juice,
I allow him to check near my hair line.
"Every time," he says, "I am the only one left
who isn't changed." When I ask him what he sees
behind my ears, he shrugs and returns to his
cereal.
That night we watch a television show that
shows clips of famous televised magic. Near the
end, a magician makes the Statue of Liberty disappear. The statue weighs 225 tons, we learn, seeing
an audience follow the action in person.
The magician prattles on about freedom and
immigrants and his mother, an enormous curtain
tellingly closed behind him. "I remember this
one," I say, ''but I didn't watch."
A set of commercials comes on. "He can't do
it," Derek says. "It's just a trick."
After the commercials, when the curtain finally opens, the statue is gone. Searchlights play over
the empty space; the live audience is astonished.
And then the magician closes the curtain again
and begins to preach about the importance of freedom, running on so long I tell Derek he's moving
the audience, not the statue. "They think they're

looking at the same space, but he's turned them," I
say. "Now he's stalling while he turns them back."
Derek leans forward and stares. When the
statue reappears, he sits up and says, "You're
wrong. It's a fake statue. He's changed it just like
the body snatchers."
"It's him, Dad," Derek says a few weeks later,
pointing at the newspaper. I am ~atching a
Pittsburgh Pirate relief pitcher walk the winning
run into scoring position.
He places the paper on my lap and shows me
the picture on the front page. I glance down at one
of those faces you know but don't know. "Who?" I
say.
"The policeman at the playhouse."
"Oh." I think of how reflexively I wave at such
people, hoping a gesture is enough. A lefthander
trudges into the nearly hopeless situation. The
heart of the lineup will surely drive in the run that
will put the Pirate losing streak at five.
"He got killed. Somebody shot him four
times."
"Around here?" For a moment, just before I
pick up the newspaper and begin to read, I think
of how many times someone has said this, looking
around the vulnerable spots in his house as if insulation could keep out every kind of weather.
The killer, the paper says, had been seeking
revenge. He had stepped out of the darkness and
fired four times through the patrol car window.
It turned out he was mistaken. The policeman
he had meant to kill was sitting in another car at
the beginning of the speed trap. They had
switched cars. It was boring, after all, to do nothing but read numbers. Thirty minutes had passed
since the killer had been given a speeding tickettime enough to go horne, load a rifle, and return.
Perhaps the road, two lanes along the river, had
reminded him of a frontier. There was a Country &
Western bar a short distance away. After he fired
the shots, the killer walked to it and ordered a beer
and smoked a cigarette, according to a patron, by
taking cowboy-film drags.
So the arrest had been simple. There was even
an eyewitness. Parked in front of the patrol car
was a pick-up truck whose driver was being cited
for littering. Sitting under the dome light, the
policeman had been writing the citation when the
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avenger fired. The litterer had looked out into the
face of a man who had just fired a rifle into the
body of a policeman. They had stared at each
other until the man on foot had crossed the road,
tossed the rifle onto the seat of his jeep, and
walked off toward the tavern.
· Later, everyone in the bar claimed they knew
he was the killer because he had been the only one
who had not rushed to the door when a man
shouted from outside that someone had been shot.
"He didn't take no mess from nobody," a
friend explained when he was interviewed. "He
didn't 'low nothin' to fool with his head."
There were short biographies of both victim
and killer. There were comments from teachers
and relatives. The killer's friend ran on for half a
column. "Bad news went down when you messed
with him," he said at the close.
After a spring of record rain, nothing for over
a week but heat, the black flies prosper. In this
part of Pennsylvania there is a characteristic fanning of the face in warm weather. A stranger riding through town would wonder at the mannerism. If he stopped to inquire, he would quickly
discover its source and either be assimilated or
covered by welts.
For fifteen minutes, I have been brushing the
gnats away and watching the lot in front of the
college auditorium fill with police cars. Five hundred uniformed mourners have been promised.
An equal number of civilians.
The black flies break into small clouds and
cover the crowd. Derek walks across the grass
toward me. He looks strange in pants-school
has been out for a week. His expression is equally out of place. A first funeral should be some
vague great-uncle who seemed to have been born
old.
We sit far to the side. There are, perhaps, a
dozen people we know here. None of them are
policemen. The service is a Catholic one. Several
priests stand on the stage, but only one is elaborately dressed. He will say the important things.
The program, I realize, is exactly like a
church service. At least until the homily, which is
filled with allegories for hope and faith. Derek
looks straight ahead. He may be afraid to tum,
believing someone will lecture him immediately
about behavior. However, when I don't read the

responses or sing the hymns, he is silent, too.
When the policemen who choose to take communion file through the aisles, all of them cup
their hands in front of them. Some lessons stay.
No one is self-conscious.
An hour of this, prayer and praise. A large picture is mounted above the closed casket. Even
from thirty rows back I can tell it's an enlargement
of the photograph in the newspaper.
The priest concludes by telling the story of a
little girl's fantasy of heaven. She claimed, when
asked, that everyone had the same expression of
happiness. It was that perfect smile, she said, the

one that animals have in my picture books. Derek
appears to be listening closely.
And then the five hundred policemen exit.
They are forming, I am sure, an elongated corridor
of grief through which the coffin and the family
will pass.f
Gary Fincke's fourth collection of short stories, Sorry
I Worried You, which won the 2003 Flannery
O'Connor Award for Short Fiction, and Amp'd: A
Father's Backstage Pass, his nonfiction account of his
son's life in two signed rock bands, were both published
in 2004.

PLAYING CARDS IN HEAVEN
There's a card game in heaven, where our mothers sit
at square card tables, on folding chairs, with cross-stitched
tablecloths, party favors, pastel mints.
The sibilance of shuffles, the triumphant slap
of a trump card well-played.
Dollie, Izzy, and Tan are sitting at poker,
fan their cards, their laughter making them young again,
housewives with small children, who are, down here,
accountants, teachers, priests.
They break for dessert: tiny marshmallows and fruit cocktail
suspended in jello, mixed nuts, Winnie's lopdippy cake,
rich mahogany devil's food, boiled icing.
They pass to the dealer, cut the deck, start a new hand.

Barbara Crooker

the inversion o(Whig history: narratives
decay in contemporary America

of liberal

Andrew Murphy

T

ALK OF DECLINE AND DECAY ABOUNDS AS THE

twenty-first century opens. Political commentators note the ever-decreasing percentage of eligible voters who actually cast ballots.
Communitarians lay a steady decrease in public
involvement and civic-mindedness squarely at the
feet of an increasingly predominant liberal ethic
that, in their view, sanctions selfish individualism
and personal gratification. A number of prominent
religious commentators view the rise of a "neutral
state" -the gradual removal of religious imagery
and rhetoric from the public square-as sparking a
steady decline in the nation's moral (and thus political) character. Environmentalists often view the
rise of modem science as initiating the steady
decline of harmonious relationships between the
Earth and its people. The ubiquitous nature of such
decline narratives in both popular and academic
circles makes a closer examination of them both
timely and important.
The decline narrative itself is perennial, of
course. Hesiod lamented his birth among the "iron"
as opposed to the lost "golden" race in the eighth
century BC. A number of Roman commentators
blamed the rise of Christianity-the turning away
of their society from its traditional religious foundations - for the empire's decline and fall. Rousseau's
Second Discourse traced the decline of "natural" man
at the hands of the "civilizing" process. In the twentieth century, Spengler's monumental Decline of the
West provided testimony to the continuing power
of the declinist approach to social and political life.
My attention is more specifically directed at a
subset of contemporary decline narratives that I
shall call "narratives of liberal decay." These
accounts of contemporary society trace its ills to
something peculiarly modem, generally called "liberalism" (as the political corollary of "the
Enlightenment'') when assessing responsibility for
cultural, political, and moral decay. Such narratives
generally view modernity as beginning in the sev18119 The Cresset
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enteenth century, focusing on the Scientific
Revolution or the important philosophical figures
of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and Newton. I
argue that contemporary narratives of liberal decay
present an inversion of what is commonly called
"Whig history," an outlook on the writing and
interpretation of history that motivated Herbert
Butterfield's famous polemic more than seventy
years ago. Whig thinkers, to generalize, view history as gradually but inevitably progressive and
trace the growth of individual liberty and constitutional government from humble beginnings to their
flowering in the modem age, triumphing over the
resistance of kings, popes, bishops, and aristocrats.
Those who invert Whig history, on the other hand,
see not progress, but decline; liberal ideas as the
motor, not of human improvement, but of creeping
alienation and the death of community and real citizenship; the "founders" of modernity not as heroes
but as villains. Both Whigs and their inverters,
though, agree about the linear directionality of history, the appropriateness of judging the past by
contemporary standards, and the role of the historian as moral judge.
what is Whig history?
The most trenchant exploration (and critique)
of the phenomenon of Whig history is provided by
Herbert Butterfield in The Whig Interpretation of
History, a work that appeared over seventy years
ago but remains keenly relevant to the writing of
history. Butterfield uses the term "Whig history"
to denote a common mode of historical writing
that is intensely and inherently present-centered
(a "study of the past with direct and perpetual reference to the present" (Butterfield, 11)), subscribes
to a notion of historical progress, and presents history as a clash between good and evil, passing
moral judgments on historical figures and developments.
Whig history tells a tale that is centered in and

If we can exclude certain things on the
constantly points to the present. What differentiground that they have no direct bearing on
ates Whig history from more genuine historical
the present, we have removed the most
work (by which he means the attempt to undertroublesome elements in the complexity
stand the coherence of the past on its own terms),
and the crooked is made straight....By seizsays Butterfield, is that this present-centeredness
ing upon those personages and parties in
causes the historian to overlook the complex and
the past whose ideas seem the more analooften-circuitous nature of the interactions between
gous to our own, and by setting these out
past and present. Instead, the Whig historian looks
in contrast with the rest of the stuff of hisfor "roots" or "anticipations" of contemporary
tory, [the Whig historian] has his organizaideas and practices (18). In Quentin Skinner's
tion and abridgment of history readywords, "the tendency to search for approxima.
made
and has a clean path through the
tions to the ideal type yields a form of non-history
complexity (25, 29).
which is almost entirely given over to pointing out
earlier 'anticipations' of later doctrines, and to
crediting each writer in terms of this clairvoyance"
This glorification of the present at the expense
(Skinner, 11; see also 9).
of the past, of course, is part and parcel of theories
Thus the Whig historian inevitably leads a
of progress (v). The notion of progress is funda"quest for origins" more inter- ___T_h_e_Wh--ig_h_i-st_o_r-ia_n___ mental to Whig history: the contemporary era is not merely the product
ested in identifying supposed
precursors to liberal ideas than inevitably leads a "quest for of historical change, but of historical

origins" more interested in
identifying supposed

improvement. The task of the Whig
historian then becomes to elucidate
within the historical record those
precursors to liberal ideas thinkers and actors who have
Certainly when one goes lookthan in understanding, in helped us reach our privileged posiall its richness and
tion.
ing for such anticipations, one
complexity, the muddled
The present-centeredness of
can find them, or rather create
them. Medieval conciliarists
Whig history combines with the
ways in which past leads notion of progress, leading the hiswere proto-social · contractaritorian to " [classify] historical perans. The Reformation sought to
to present.
sonages ... into the men who furassert the sovereignty of individual conscience, and so on. In Butterfield's view,
thered progress and the men who tried to hinder
it..." (11). This classification produces a third feathe Whig historian too often forgets that he or she
ture of Whig history, the tendency to pass moral
is creating, not merely tracing, this purported line
of development, and we are left with a crude view
judgments on historical figures. When we consider
of historical figures and texts, with subsequent
both the present-centeredness and the progress
narrative inherent in Whig history, it becomes
commentators positing meanings that the figures
apparent what sorts of judgments are most likely
under consideration could not conceivably have
to emerge: ones that suggest "the modern
meant to propose, and which may have only the
most tenuous relationship to the affairs of the time
world ...[emerged] as the victory of the children of
in which the texts were produced.
light over the children of darkness ... " (28). Thus
Whig history is in fact the antithesis of an attempt
Not only do these processes- "line-drawing"
at genuine historical understanding, "the result of
through history and the search for anticipations of
later ideas-result in abbreviated, abridged
the practice of abstracting things from their historaccounts that gloss over vast differences to emphaical context and judging them apart from their consize purported similarities, they also present an
text-estimating them and organizing the historioversimplified version of the almost-inevitable trical story by a system of direct reference to the present" (30-31).
umph of currently prevalent ideals.
in understanding, in all its richness and complexity, the muddled ways in which past leads to
present
(Butterfield,
43).

what is a decline narrative?
Several aspects of the decline narrative will be
important for the analysis I put forward in this
essay, and I shall outline them briefly here. First, of
course, decline narratives are narratives, and thus
they organize historical material into a story intended to teach a lesson or drive home a theme.
Definitions of narrative are both widespread and
widely varied, but Michael J. Toolan's definition of
narrative as "a perceived sequence of non-randomly connected events" is a worthwhile place to
start (7, 4). Hayden White, who has done as much
as any scholar to raise issues of narrative in historical inquiry, portrays narrative as, most basically, the
imposition of story form on historical events or
social reality: "narrativization produces a meaning
quite different than that produced by chronicalization ... the narrative serves to transform a list of historical events that would otherwise be only a chronicle into a story" (White 1984, 19-20; see also White
1987, 2). Donald E. Polkinghome calls narrative "a
scheme by means of which human beings give
meaning to their experience of temporality and personal actions" (11). The definitional questions surrounding narrative have spawned a literature all
their own, but I take the elements raised in this
paragraph-an emphasis on storytelling, the stitching together of discrete events into a thematic
account of meaningful change over time-as an
appropriate starting point for this essay's concerns.
With regard to the substance of these narratives,
decline accounts identify a specific phenomenon or
group of phenomena as central to understanding
the contemporary social condition and as illustrative of the seriousness of contemporary decline.
Declinists claim that contemporary society has
gone badly wrong and offer vivid examples and/or
statistics to back up these claims. Alongside claims
about the prevalence of decline go claims about the
causes thereof. The narratives of liberal decay I shall
examine here extract specific features of something
called "modernity" and its political and philosophical counterpart, liberalism, as the root cause of contemporary decline. Generally speaking, declinists
ascribe causality to ideas. Although at times social,
economic, or other material causes are included in
their explanations, the declinists considered in this
essay tend to see these features of contemporary
society as the caused manifestations of wrong20 121 The Cresset
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headed ideas about human nature, society, or epistemology.
The identification of symptoms and causes of
decline leads naturally to reflection on its timing.
Decline narratives generally look to a time in the
past that initiated the current decline and trace out
the implications of these nefarious ideas as they are
progressively realized in subsequent years. As
mentioned above, the notion of "modernity" being
associated with instrumental rationality or skeptical epistemologies leads many narratives of liberal
decay to point to early modem natural science or
moral philosophy for these beginnings. Others
think the decline began more recently-the 1960s,
for example. But all narratives of liberal decay suggest that degenerative potential is inherent in liberal modernity and awaits only a fortuitous set of circumstances to break forth.
Narratives of liberal decay thus present
accounts of actual historical developments with an
explicitly evaluative dimension, a normative or
moral judgment. In important ways, critics aver,
previous times were better; current times are worse.
Of course, all narratives contain some organizing
principle, a driving aim that structures the discussion and by which each author decides what gets
included and what does not. After all, narratives
represent ways in which human beings attempt to
order events sensibly and coherently and in doing
so are invariably drawn to reflect on the meaning
and significance of historical changes. What differentiates decline narratives in this respect is the
overt, explicit, and moralistic nature of those judgments. Declinists do not merely organize their
accounts of historical developments around specific
trends or organizational themes-the rise of technology, the influence of patriarchal ideas, or the
growth of market economies, for example-but
inherent to the decline account is an explicit condemnation of those developments. Social change
has not been morally neutral or progressive, but
represents a setback along important social
dimensions.
Decline narratives thus present a notion of linear directionality in human affairs, insisting that
society is moving steadily away from a desirable,
and toward a recognizably inferior, state of affairs.
Declinists often signal this linearity by using terms
like "increasingly" and "more and more" when

metaphor, leading us to an increasingly alienated
referring to undesirable outcomes (or, conversely,
"less and less" in reference to desirable outcomes),
relationship with our natural world.
On this view, simply put, late twentieth-centuas well as biological metaphors such as "atrophy''
ry society has "transgressed the limits [of the carryor "entropy," and the more straightforward signifiers "declining," "decaying," "decadence," or
ing capacity of the ecological commons] and ha[ s]
"degeneracy." Sometimes the imagery is quite
begun to destroy our life-support system" (Ophuls,
10). This ecological transgression takes many forms:
graphic, as when the authors of Habits of the Heart
global warming, destruction of the ozone layer,
refer to contemporary individualism as "cancerous" (Bellah, vii) or when Robert Bork refers to "the
rampant pollution and deforestation, overpopulaspreading rot" of liberalism in today's culture (153).
tion, uncontrolled technology, unsustainable conLinear directionality, however, need not imply
sumption of fossil fuels, and an increasingly fierce
inevitability. Indeed, the rhetorical power of decline
competition for increasingly scarce natural
narratives lies largely in their exhortations to their
resources. Behind the physical decay, moreover, lies
an existential sense of crisis. We no longer view
audience to recognize the error of their ways, rectify the root problem that gave rise - - - - - - - - - - - - - nature as a "living being," and
The rhetorical power oif
to the decline, and rededicate
thus the modem age has witdecline narratives lies
nessed "the accelerated exploitathemselves to the values that will
put their society back on the road largely in their exhortations tion of both human and natural
to civic, moral, spiritual, or ecologresources in the name of culture
to their audience to
ical health. But declinists hasten to
recognize the error of their and progress" (Merchant, xxii).
point out that the situation is dire,
The destructive effect of contemways, rectify the root
the time for action now.
porary humans on the environproblem that gave rise to ment-the outgrowth of this
of
liberal
decay:
a
few
narratives
the decline, and rededicate alienated relationship with our
examples
natural
surroundings-has
themselves to the values
In what follows, I offer a few
resulted in an ecological catasthat will put their society trophe that threatens our very
examples of the main categories in
back on the road to civic, existence.
which narratives of liberal decay
moral, spiritual, or
have appeared in recent years.
What,
specifically,
has
These categorizations are meant to
caused such damage to the natuecological health.
be heuristic and suggestive, not
ral environment and humans'
mutually exclusive, and certainly not exhaustive. I
relationship with it? According to this environsuspect, however, that the general outlines of the
mental critique, the mechanistic paradigm characarguments will be familiar to readers.
teristic of modern science has sanctioned (if not
explicitly celebrated) the pillage of nature for
the environmental narrative of liberal decay.
human purposes and the exercise of human
For many contemporary environmental
power and domination over nature. Ophuls
thinkers, the notion of decline carries distinctly ecostresses that "the mind-matter and man-nature
logical overtones. Environmental theorists clearly
dualism that is intrinsic to modern thought" repidentify a problem in the health of our natural enviresents the root of the ecological crisis we face,
ronment, identify its ideological root in the past,
claiming that "the language of modem life is funand trace the destructive influence of those probdamentally anti-ecological," and "few comprelematic ideas over time. The contemporary world,
hend the degree to which ecology contradicts the
on this account, represents the culmination (or,
modem way of life" (Ophuls, xi, 2). The modem
more appropriately, the nadir) of a process that
scientific worldview championed by Bacon,
began with the Scientific Revolution in early modDescartes, and Hobbes that emerged in sixteenthem Europe. The mechanistic worldview that took
and seventeenth-century Europe, is largely to
shape and became dominant during those years has
blame for our current ecological situation. In
become our governing scientific-indeed, socialCarolyn Merchant's words, "Between 1500 and

1700, the Western world began to take on features
that, in the dominant opinion of today, would
make it modern and progressive" (Merchant,
xxiii). In these years, more specifically, "an incredible transformation took place ... The world in
which we live today was bequeathed to us by
Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm von
Leibniz ... " (Merchant, 288, 275). Fritjof Capra uses
strikingly similar terminology: "Between 1500
and 1700 there was a dramatic shift in the way
people pictured the world and in their whole way
of thinking .. . The notion of an organic, living, and
spiritual universe was replaced by that of the
world as a machine, and the world-machine
became the dominant metaphor of the modern
era" (37-38). Recall too, that for such thinkers historical claims are evaluative claims, thus the previous holism and organicism that characterized
society was superior in key ways to modern society. The "new mechanical order... and its associated
values of power and control" replaced "animistic,
organic assumptions about the cosmos." The
result was, quite simply, "the death of nature ...the
most far-reaching effect of the Scientific
Revolution" (Merchant, 190, 193). The organic
philosophy prevalent in medieval Europe, for all
its drawbacks, "placed people within rather than
above nature" (Merchant, 83). From its earliest
days, modern science has walked hand in hand
with nascent capitalism, commercial values, and
the destruction of nature.

liberal decay and the decline of community.
The decline of community has become a prominent theme in discussions about the state of contemporary American society. The core problem,
according to communitarians, consists of a nexus of
factors: the ever-increasing presence of individualistic, rights-oriented rhetoric within the citizenry;
the corresponding decline of community cohesion,
faith, and participation in government, and the
notion of civic obligation; and the erosion of personal ties, particularly but not exclusively family
and traditional communities. The National
Commission on Civic Renewal, for example,
laments the fact that "[t]oo many of us lack confidence in our capacity to make basic moral and civic
judgments, to join with our neighbors to do the
work of community, to make a difference .... [This
22123 The Cresset

Advent/Christmas I 2005

crisis of citizenship results in the] degradation of
our civic environment."
Such concerns are voiced by a wide variety of
critics. As Sandel puts it, "two fears-for the loss of
self-government and the erosion of communitytogether define the anxiety of the age" (3). Robert
Bellah and his collaborators voice their concern that
American individualism "may have grown cancerous-that it may be destroying those social integuments that Tocqueville saw as moderating its more
destructive potentialities, that it may be threatening
the survival of freedom itself" (Bellah, 1985, vii).
Amitai Etzioni describes a "society that increasingly threatens to become normless, self-centered, and
driven by greed, special interests, and an
unabashed quest for power" (1993, 254; see also
1996, chapter 1).
What lies at the heart of these pathologies?
Sandel blames the "procedural republic" and
"unencumbered selves": a government dedicated
to neutrality between citizens' competing conceptions of the good, and the individualistic notion of
an antecedent, willing self independent of its
claimed ends. Clearly the procedural republic represents the victory of a language of individualism
over other, more corporate, traditions in American
history. The rise of market capitalism undermines
community cohesion and broader notions of obligation. In Henry Tam's words, market individualism's "cancerous effects on community life" creates
a society in which "selfishness becomes a moral
code" (3--4).
How did this state of affairs come to pass?
Generally speaking, communitarians agree that
"liberalism" as a school of thought, stretching back
to the seventeenth century, set in place a destructive
individualistic potential that was not immediately
realized. Locke's "radical philosophical defense of
individual rights" became important due to his
enormous influence in America, says Bellah (1985,
80). The communitarian narrative of liberal decay
notes the connection between Lockean ideas and
the emerging market system, agreeing with many
environmental critics that liberalism and capitalism
share coequal blame due to their closely interconnected hegemony over the modem world.
Furthermore, communitarians argue that the
predominant individualist understanding of
American freedom does not accurately represent

either the theory or practice of American life for
much of the nation's history. In Bellah's words,
[W]e have never been, and still are not, a
collection of private individuals who,
except for a conscious contract to create a
minimal government, have nothing in
common. Our lives make sense in a thousand ways, most of which we are unaware
of, because of traditions that are centuries,
if not millennia, old. It is these traditions
that help us to know that it does make a
difference who we are and how we treat
one another (1985, 282).
Sandel argues that the more specific and troubling consequences of liberal thought-radical
individualism and state neutrality-have arisen
only in the past forty or fifty years. As Etzioni puts
it, "Once, rights were very solemn moral/legal
claims." He lays responsibility for decline more
recently, noting that no consensual values have
emerged in American society in the wake of the
widespread questioning and rebellion of the 1960s
(Etzione 1993, 6, 24; see also 1996, Introduction).
modernity's moral decay: a neoclassical critique
The specific manifestations of contemporary
decline are, according to the neoclassical critique,
symptomatic of a deeper crisis in contemporary
society: far more serious than the specific immoralities that dot our landscape, contemporary individuals have lost the capacity to talk meaningfully and
consistently about-and take action on the basis
of-morality itself. As opposed to classical philosophy, which emphasized such concepts as virtue,
duty, and the common good, liberalism eschews a
public vision and celebrates a hedonistic, instrumental morality. Our moral landscape is little more
than "emotivism," in which despite our protestations of rationality we consider moral arguments to
be incommensurable statements of preference. In
Leo Strauss's words,

The original notion [of liberal democracy]
was that this sovereign individual was a
conscientious individual, the individual
limited and guided by his conscience ....
This change which has taken place and is

still taking place may be called the decline
of liberal democracy into permissive egalitarianism. Whereas the core of liberal
democracy is the conscientious individual,
the core of permissive egalitarianism is the
individual with his urges .... This is the
moral decline which has taken place
(Strauss 1972, 222-223).
According to this critique, modem liberalism's
rise and increasing hegemony have produced a
society in which taking moral stands is virtually
impossible. Modernity is, in effect, subjectivism
writ large. Our sights are lowered, away from classical concerns about the best city and toward pragmatic and programmatic questions of practicality.
According to one Aristotelian account, "talk about
the common good has been all but abandoned"
(Smith, 625).
Why have these things come to pass? The most
fundamental reason, on this account, lies in the
Enlightenment project itself, that formative philosophical undertaking that defines modernity.
Enlightenment thinkers rejected the teleology
inherent in classical thought, proclaiming a view of
humans as preference-maximizers without any
more transcendent goal than relatively short-term
gratification. According to Alasdair Macintyre, the
effect of "the [Enlightenment's] joint rejection of
both Protestant and Catholic theology and the sciand
philosophical
rejection
of
entific
Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of
man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos" (54).
[The history of contemporary moral crisis]
cannot be told adequately apart from an
account of the attempts to provide a rational justification for morality in that historical
period-say from 1630 to 1850.... A central
thesis of this book is that the breakdown of
this project provided the historical background against which the predicaments of
our own culture can become intelligible
(Macintyre, 39).
In such a society, we note the tendency for
impersonal bureaucracy, with its claims to dispassionate rationality, to displace democratic, deliberative, or nonscientific ways of proceeding.

This particular narrative of liberal decay, then,
points to the Enlightenment project that attempted
to ground morality solely on rationality, as destructive of a commitment to public virtue and the pursuit of excellence. The three waves of modernity
identified by Strauss culminate in Nietzsche's view
that "all human life and human thought ultimately
rests on horizon-forming creations which are not
susceptible of rational legitimization" (1959, 56).
Such a view of morality leaves us with no firm
moral footing, with what Macintyre calls an "emotivism" that cannot distinguish moral sentiments
from expressions of preference. Modem liberalism
initiates, and spurs on, moral decay.
the spiritual narrative of liberal decay
What is wrong with contemporary society in
the eyes of those proposing a primarily spiritual
account of liberal decay? Contemporary American
society is awash in the fruits of a disordered spiritual condition; one might say "sin": crime, divorce,
illegitimacy, drug use, abortion, dishonesty, sexual
libertinism, and so on. Richard John Neuhaus notes
the
understandable reaction to the lethalliberationisms that reached their frenzied apex
in the late sixties and early seventies.
Drugs, cults, mass murders, the explosion
in divorce, teen-age pregnancies, and abortion- all these have, in the eyes of conservatives, vindicated their warnings about
the consequences of cultural decadence
(1984, 140).
Traditional restraining and moderating institutions such as family, religion, morality, and law
have been undermined progressively by a spreading radical individualism and egalitarianism that
celebrates individual choice as its cardinal value,
idealizing "the unconstrained self" (Bork, 125).
This spreading individualism represents the loss
of a formerly prevalent moral consensus. Divisive
issues like obscene art, multiculturalism, and affirmative action highlight the deep cultural and
political fissures that beset a society that once
agreed on a basic moral code. The gradual exclusion of religion from the public square both signals the triumph of a new liberal ethic (that of state
24125 The Cresset
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neutrality) and contributes to a continuing process
of moral and cultural decline.
Robert Bork blames much of the contemporary
situation on the baleful effects of the 1960s, "the
decade that changed America" (17). Student radicals were, in his words, little more than "antinomians," literally a law unto themselves without moral
or religious grounding (54). Abetted by rising affluence, technology, and the growth of universities,
among other things, the 1960s "saw an explosive
expansion of certain American (and Western) ideals
and a corresponding diminution of others." The
moral order that lay behind the Declaration of
Independence's calls for liberty and the pursuit of
happiness were forgotten in the stampede for personal fulfillment (56; also 57-61).
But for Bork, investigating the roots of these
contemporary problems pushes us further back
into the meaning of modernity itself. According to
Bork, Enlightenment thinkers- Locke, Montesquieu, Smith, Jefferson-presumed that individuals could and would create a pacific social order
free of the confines of religion, tradition, and other
conventional restraints. Unfortunately, such optimism proved unwarranted. "The Enlightenment
optimists made a serious mistake about the nature
of the individual human in whom they placed so
much faith ...Though they surely did not envision
a society resembUng ours, they set in motion a
tendency ,which, carried far enough, could and
eventually did free the individual from almost all
moral and legal constraints" (Bork, 58). Neuhaus
pinpoints the increasing relegation of religion to
the private sphere as part of a "secularizing
mythology" that distorts the nation's history and
founding values (Neuhaus, 98). Such a mythology
ignores the fact that "the values of the American
people are deeply rooted in religion," and that
"their religious allegiances are identifiably JudeaChristian" (21, 95). On this reading, the hostility
to religion in the public sphere represents "a novelty, a break with the one tradition of the republic" (102). Using terms like "amazingly recent,"
"relatively recent," "recent decades," "recent
years," and "the very recent past," Neuhaus
stresses the break with tradition that signals the
downfall of public religion in America, and its
consequent social and political pathologies (24;
28; 37, 99; 112; 112).

structural similarities, normative inversions
What could Whig history, with its progressive
historical narrative, possibly share with the tales of
decline and decay outlined above? Indeed, hasn't
faith in progress been largely eradicated from contemporary historical writing? No longer do we
encounter the confident assertion that the future
will be better than the past that characterized so
much eighteenth- and nineteenth-century (not to
mention mid-twentieth century) historical writing.
The violence, savagery, and rapacity of the twentieth century has made such a belief in progress difficult to sustain, almost comical. Instead, scholars
generally present a much more chastened,
nuanced version of the relationship between past
and present and the nature of historical research.
In the history of political thought, this new understanding is best illustrated in the Cambridge
School, most notably in the work of Quentin
Skinner, John Dunn, and others. In the history of
science, traditional forward-looking linear narratives have fallen largely by the wayside in the wake
of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions and the
work that followed it. If this is the case, though,
aren't we dealing with a fundamentally different
sort of historiography and political context of historical research?
Still, a number of important and intriguing
areas of convergence do exist between contemporary narratives of liberal decay and more tradi-tional Whig history. Recent narratives of liberal
decay retain two of the central and problematic
characteristics of Whig history: its present-centered
focus and its tendency to pass moral judgments on
historical figures and developments. At the same
time, each of these structural similarities appears
with a corresponding inversion that illuminates the
ways in which narratives of liberal decay reverse the
normative judgments of traditional Whig history.
The present-centered focus-the practice of
searching back into history for the roots of modem
outcomes for which we may then assign blame and
praise-is an integral part of the Whig tradition of
historiography. Yet the declinist is as much
engaged in a "quest for origins" as was the traditional Whig historian who sought to glorify the
present at the expense of a benighted past. Recall
that the decline narrative begins with a recitation
of present degeneracy.

Once the symptoms of decline are clearly laid
out, the search for historical culprits is on. For
example, what Robert Bellah and his collaborators
call "the improvisational self"-the autonomous
pursuit of individual wants free of religion, family,
or moral example as constraints-so they tell us,
"is derived not only from psychotherapy, but much
more fundamentally from modem philosophy,
from Descartes, Locke, and Hume, who affect us
more than we imagine" (80). Carolyn Merchant
admits early on in her insightful historical account
of the Scientific Revolution and the emergence of
modem mechanism that "[t]he central problem of
this book is informed by the concerns of the present" (xxii). Michael Sandel tells us that "[t]imes of
trouble prompt us to recall the ideals by which we
live" (3): determining "how the liberal conception
of citizenship and freedom gradually crowded out
the republican conception" (6) thus provides the
impetus for Sandel's incursion into the history of
the American republic (Sandel, 3, 6).
Alongside this structural similarity-the present-centeredness of both Whig history and narratives of liberal decay -lies of course an inversion of
the evaluative claim that each attaches to the present. Instead of a Whig notion of historical progress
and contemporary superiority over the past, declinists posit a theory of decline. Behind the evaluative
claim about the reality of present decline lies an historical-ideological one, the claim that the roots of
this decline are to be found in past ideas. In Robert
Bark's words, "The mistake the Enlightenment
founders of liberalism made about human nature
has brought us to this-an increasing number of
alienated, restless individuals without strong ties to
others, except in the pursuit of ever more degraded
distractions and sensations" (Bark, 63). Previous
eras were not darkened ages yearning for enlightenment, but instead were-slavery, patriarchy, and
racial discrimination notwithstanding-superior to
contemporary society in key ways. Both Whig and
decline narratives present historical directionality
in a linear and cumulative manner. Declinists merely change the direction of the arrow, painting the
line in a downward, rather than ascending, direction.
Second, both Whig history and decline narratives share a tendency to view themselves as moral
arbiters of historical developments. The inversion

of this structural similarity-the moral judgment of
Hobbes, Bacon, Mill, Kant-and we know that the
history-appears, most vividly, in the ways in
modem age is declining and decadent, then clearly
which different groups and individuals get evaluatthose figures must be, at least partially, to blame. A
ed and judged. At times, these judgments border on
long list of blameworthy parties emerge from conthe anachronistic. For example, Carolyn Merchant
temporary narratives of liberal decay: liberals,
criticizes Francis Bacon for supporting "antifemirationalists, secularists, individualists, to name just
nist" legislation in the late-sixteenth and early seva few. These figures are typically considered, by
enteenth-century (Merchant, 165). But the general
declinists, to have brought us to this unpleasant
phenomenon is more widespread. Consider, for
pass. Those who opposed them represent the oppoexample, the contemporary debate between liberals
site position-community, religion, morality,
and communitarians. Beginning from the methodholism, and so on-and are considered not only
ological assumption that contemporary concerns
worthy of praise for attempting to withstand
animate historical research, and from the normative
modernity's relentless (and eventually victorious?)
claim that contemporary society is
onslaught, but also as possessing
mired in decline, it seems natural Whig history understated insights into how to correct our
the contributions the past own decline.
then to ask, "Whom shall we blame
for what has come to pass?"
This tendency, in which histohad made to our complex
Perhaps Thomas Hobbes and John
propose assessments of
rians
contemporary situation
Locke are to blame for our contemblame on long-dead political
and passed moralistic
porary anomie, disaffection with
thinkers, rests on the assumption
judgments
on
historical
government, and aggressive accuthat such thinkers are somehow
actors and outcomes.
mulation of property, suggest
responsible-and thus can justifiNarratives
of
liberal
decay
Ophuls and Bellah. "When all is
ably be "blamed"- for the uses
do the same thing in
said and done, Descartes, Bacon,
made by their views long after
Hobbes, and the other authors of
reverse. Neither of these their promulgation, indeed long
after the thinkers' death. Often this
the Enlightenment paradigm were
ways of approaching
megalomaniacs: their aim was not
history and its relationship tactic appears somewhat obliquemerely to dominate nature but to
ly. Many of the narratives of liberto
contemporary
events
is
do so violently, brutally, absoluteal decay considered in this essay,
helpful or enlightening.
as we have seen, note that fullly'' (Ophuls, 186). "In seventeenthNeither
helps
us
blown liberalism is a relatively
century England, a radical philosophical defense of individual understand the past, assess recent phenomenon. But declinists
also suggest that the damaging
rights emerged that owed little to
the present, or think
either classical or biblical sources .... seriously about the future. potential was present all along,
and often take on a tone of denunJohn Locke is the key figure and
one enormously influential in America" (Bellah
ciation when describing the thought of early mod1985, 143).
em thinkers like Locke and (especially) Hobbes.
Earlier Whig accounts often presented heroic
This kind of blame-mongering has a destructive
effect on any hope for historical understanding and
figures from the past, struggling for representative
rests on controversial and unstated hypotheses
government and religious liberty against the concerted efforts of ignorant or self-interested elites
about the intention of historical authors and the
(For example Macaulay 1828; Jordan 1932).
"responsibility" of such authors for the uses to
which their ideas are put centuries after their
Narratives of liberal decay, instead, invert Whig history's sympathy for history's winners and its excodeaths.
riation of losers. They suggest that we emulate
ANY OF THE DISPUTES BROUGHT ON BY THE
those who opposed trends that we associate with the
above two problematic features of
"modem" age. The logic is straightforward. If we
contemporary narratives of liberal
can identify those thinkers who, on some reading,
most closely resemble modem ideas- Locke,
decay-its present-centeredness and its moralistic

M
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tone-have to do with broader explicit or implicit
about
"modernity"
or
"the
claims
Enlightenment." We have seen above how often
something called "the Enlightenment" or "modern" thought-be it modern science, rationalist
philosophy, or secular understandings of public
life-are often claimed to lie at the heart of contemporary social decline. But talk of, for example,
a unitary "Enlightenment project," as does
Alasdair Macintyre (1984, chapters 4-6), perpetuates a myth created by critics and reduces a philosophically and politically diverse movement to an
undifferentiated mass, flattening out national
differences and philosophical nuance in the search
for a stick with which to beat contemporary
society. Only a highly truncated understanding of
modern thought could so quickly subsume modern views of political authority this way. What
becomes of the Scottish Enlightenment, or the
English? What of the multifaceted American
Enlightenment, or the work of Catholic social
thinker Charles Taylor or Archbishop of
Canterbury Rowan Williams?
These overstated claims about "the
Enlightenment project" are deeply troubling, since
they prevent us from confronting the complexity
of our own times. On this view of modernity at
war with religious values, or true community, or
the environment, or moral principles, the continued presence of any of these values (widespread
religious belief, or authentic community, or environmental consciousness, or firm moral standards) can only be explained as a kind of vicarious
holdover from earlier times, and not, for example,
as authentic examples of a more complex and religion-friendly modernity than one might expect
from merely reading Hobbes and Kant (See also
Yack 1997).
Butterfield was right. Whig history distorts
the past and places historical research in service of
a polemical narrative about present superiority
and past ignorance. But in getting beyond such
overt Whiggism, we seem not to have displaced a
defective way of studying the history of political
thought but merely to have inverted it, reversed its
normative valuation. Unrealistic celebrations of
present superiority have given way to unrealistic
denigrations of contemporary degeneracy. Whig
history understated the contributions the past had

II}ade to our complex contemporary situation and
passed moralistic judgments on historical actors
and outcomes. Narratives of liberal decay do the
same thing in reverse. Neither of these ways of
approaching history and its relationship to contemporary events is helpful or enlightening.
Neither helps us understand the past, assess the
present, or think seriously about the future. f
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Announcing the

Arlin 6. Meyer Frize 200G
The National Network Board of the lilly Fellows Program in the Humanities
and the Arts is proud to announce the 2006 Arlin G. Meyer Prize.
The Meyer Prize is awarded annually to a fulltime faculty member from a college or university in the Lilly Fellows Program National
Network. Work that highly exemplifies the practice of the Christian artistic or scholarly vocation in relation to any pertinent subject
matter or literary and artistic style will be considered. The Prize will be awarded in different years for works of creative imagination and
for works of scholarship. The 2006 Arlin G. Meyer Prize will reward the author of a creative work that emerges from his or her practice
of the vocation of the Christian visual artist, in accord with the principles and ideals of the Lilly Fellows Program.
The Prize honors Arlin G. Meyer, Professor Emeritus of English at Valparaiso University, who served as program director of the Lilly
Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts from its inception in 1990 until his retirement in 2002.
The Prize of $3000 will be awarded at the Lilly Fellows Program National Conference at Xavier University-Cincinnati, October 13-15,

2006.
The 2006 Arlin G. Meyer Prize will be given to an otiginal work of visual art in one of the following categories:
•

Sculpture

•

Water color

•

Sketches

•

Fabric Art

•

Painting

•

Drawing

•

Ceramics

•

Printmaking

•

Photography

Nomination Procedure
1.

Each Lilly Fellows Program National Network institution may nominate one work for the 2006 Arlin G. Meyer Prize. The institution
may select its nominee through any process.

2.

The work must have been created by a fulltime faculty member or administrator at a current Lilly Fellows Program National
Network institution.

3.

The work must have been exhibited for the public during the calendar year 2003, 2004, or 2005.

4.

A nomination must include:
•

5.

A cover letter of nomination signed by one or both of the two official LFP representatives from the nominating institution

•

CDs of the nominated visual art

•

A statement or narrative of approximately 500 words by the author explaining how the work exemplifies the practice of
the Christian academic or artistic vocation

•

The artist's cuniculum vitae

Nominations must be sent to the selection coordinator for the 2006 Arlin G. Meyer Prize:
Dr. Lisa DeBoer, Meyer Prize Coordinator
Dept. of Art, Westmont College
955 La Paz Road
Santa Barbara, CA 93108

6. Nomination deadline: March 1, 2006. Nominations received after this date cannot be considered.
Future subjects of the Arlin G. M eyer Prize

2007 NON-FICTION • 2008 PERFORMANCE ART • 2009 MUSIC

•

mUSIC
suspended soul
J.D. Buhl

M

AYBE IN POLISH PEOPLE KNOW HOW TO

write about this music. I heard the language all around me while leaving the
club, insistent whispers in the misty night.
Dispersing up wet sidewalks, couples and groups
of three and four conversed in hushed, excited
tones about the performance we'd just experienced. And they seemed to know what to say, their
Polish flowing like the fluttery trumpet lines we
listened to for nearly two hours. There must be
adjectives, images, I thought, phrases in his native
language that can capture what this artist does.
Confined to English, I wandered to the car silent,
my mind a blank page, wondering if I'd ever find
words to describe the music of the Tomasz Stanko
Quartet.
The usual routine at Yoshi's Jazz and Sushi in
Oakland is that an act will play two sets, 8:00 and
10:00 p.m., for separate seatings. For some reason,
this stop on Stanko's North American Tour was
limited to one show at 10:00, and the club was
packed. The usually diverse crowd Yoshi's draws
was more so. High anticipation was upped by the
night's humidity. I met several people who came
on the strength of what they had read or heard of
Stanko, knowing next to nothing about his music.
What they received was a concert of exceptional tenderness, delivered with tough-minded
precision. Consisting entirely of selections from
the group's current release Suspended Night (ECM
Records), the night did indeed seem suspended.
The trio plays even more intensely live, and
Stanko is even more understated, if that is possible. He seems so utterly aware of what he's doing,
of the pictures he's painting in space with his horn,
that one must struggle through the clutter of one's
own psyche to meet him at the lip of the stage. I
found the performance both excoriating and
ecstatic. I'll never forget it.
In a burgundy suit, Stanko would circle center
stage, his face and wire-framed glasses shaded by
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a wide-brimmed hat. The trio surrounds him:
Marcin Wasilewski, his shaved head hung over the
piano keyboard; tall Slawomir Kurkiewicz
wrapped around his bass; and Michal Miskiewicz
looking intently over the drums. Emitting a series
of trills and smears, soothing cries and heavy
sighs, the leader's melodic minimalism informed,
but did not drive, each piece.
Stanko (1942) is one of Poland's greatest jazz
artists, and the first to achieve an international
reputation. While much of the music he's known
for was released only in Europe, a new "Selected
Recordings" compilation in the ":rarum" series
(number XVII) presents a cross-section of his
mostly-1990s work for ECM. This is glorious stuff,
as heavy and uplifting as a rain storm. But serious
Stanko-watchers agree with Brian Morton of The
Nation that "it was with the creation of his current
quartet that Stanko cemented his position as a
bandleader and composer, as well as a trumpet
player."
The quartet's material deals in transformation.
On Suspended Night and 2002's Soul of Things,
Stanko plays against the beautiful backing of his
young cohorts to create endlessly fascinating variations on a theme, plainly stated within emotionally complex settings. The music is pastoral, calm,
passionate, but not "romantic." There is a narrative quality to Stanko's long solo passages; however, this is not storytelling in the familiar Lester
Young sense of jazz communication. Stanko is into
something more abstract, but he himself is so
intentional that each listener is addressed, their
own story called forth.
And there is no received context-such as
swing or free or homage to Miles Davis (though
Miles and Chet Baker are undeniable influences)-that determines every move. Just as there
is no self-interpreting text, Stanko's music does not
come with its meanings predetermined. This does
not mean it is free beyond form or a series of ran-

dom, if interesting, bleats and blurts meant to provide a musical experience. The melody is always
present, considered. Each variation has a definite
shape. The trio impresses at all times with its
understanding of itself as the canvas to which the
composer is adding his strokes.
And Stanko himself is the loveliest, most probing, pointed trumpet player I've ever heard. You
could say he does not go in for parenthetical statements, just long, warm sustains that seem to have
your whole life in them. But his is a beauty born of
weakness. Stanko's tone is often frail or fragile, the
dashed line of a freeway below your elbow rather
than the hard whites of an off-ramp. The tone is
not introverted. His brooding melancholy, unlike
Baker's, does not draw the listener into itself. This
is not "mood music" any more than the French
New Wave was "mood cinema."
Both Soul of Things and Suspended Night use for
their cover art stills from Jean-Luc Godard films.
Interviewing fellow director Michelangelo
Antonioni in the 1960s, Godard asks him about
Red Desert, a film thought to condemn industrial
society and its deadening effect upon the individual, not to mention the landscape. But Antonioni
insists that "the line .. . the curves of factories and
their smokestacks are perhaps more beautiful than
a row of trees."
Stanko began his professional career with
Krzysztof Komeda, a composer who contributed
scores to several Roman Polanski films. Stanko's
Litania album is a tribute to Komeda's work. And
the music on these new discs can best be described
as cinematic. This means not that it is "soundtracky," lending itself well to visual accompaniment, but that this music is image. It is the visual
experience. Live, this effect is heightened. The
experience is not what you're seeing (four musicians on stage, etc.), but what is being created to be
seen. It is jazz for the eyes.
For Godard, filmmaker and critic, there is "a
clear continuity between all forms of expression ...
The important thing is to approach it from the side
which suits you best." After years in the avant-

garde, Stanko found that what suits him best is the
ballade approach, free and romantic, sharp as a
sword. Urging me to hear a copy of Stanko's From
the Green Hill he'd just burned, a friend sighed,
"This music hurts, it's so beautiful." There, his
tone is more Miles-like than elsewhere, Stanko
swings out from behind bandoneon and violin,
leaving fresh cuts in the tunic of the present
moment.
But now we're back to the necessity of my
learning Polish to do this music justice.
The same week I viewed the Quartet's creations at Yoshi's, a more famous Pole was dying.
While protesters demanded that Terri Schiavo
should be made to live forever on a feeding tube,
Karol Wojtyla-Pope John Paul II-was quietly
allowed to die with dignity. It was said in Time that
his papacy was so exceptional because, unlike the
many out-of-touch Popes before him, Wojtyla
"lived in the early twentieth century world about
as intensely as it was imaginable to do and still
survive it." This is a quality we often admire in our
jazz greats, men and women who become spiritual symbol-makers for generations to come. Stanko
says of Wasilewski, Kurkiewicz, and Miskiewicz
(who have their own album, Trio) that "they are
rooted in the traditional, but sensitive to the contemporary." Such "fresh and mature" players lend
a sense of having survived something they have
not yet lived.
In Godard's First Name: Carmen, the director
plays Uncle Jean, a man who has survived too
much. When his wild niece tries to coax him out of
his hospital bed to make a movie, he complains,
"We should close our eyes, not open them." The
Stanko Quartet wants us to open our eyes-to
jazz; to a European, peculiarly Polish jazz; to
another beauty, as smooth and startling as the line
of smokestacks. f
J.D. Buhl has upgraded his day job, but is still looking
for full-time teaching work. He remains adjunct faculty
at Holy Names University, St. Mary's College, and the
University of San Francisco

[ilm
t he last picture shows
james Combs
I GREW UP, THERE STANDS THE
forlorn and empty remnants of the Russell
Theater, which was the county movie house
for many decades before it dosed in 1959. For me,
that otherwise unused building remains a monument of sweet nostalgia. In the late 1940s and
throughout the 1950s, that place was where I was
educated. A lonely, shy boy, I hated school and
small-town life, but I dearly loved the movies. I
saw everything, from the kiddy Westerns, the serials, the Saturday double features, up to and more
memorably the great films, the imagery from
which was unforgettable to a gawky boy awed in
the dark-John Wayne standing in the doorway at
the end of The Searchers, Montgomery Clift playing
taps for Maggio in From Here to Eternity, Marilyn
Monroe singing "Diamonds are a Girl's Best
Friend" in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, Audrey
Hepburn looking regal in Roman Holiday. The most
electric moment was watching the recently
deceased James Dean in Rebel without a Cause. The
guy was dead, yet there he was up on the screen as
if he were still alive. And he was, and amazingly,
still is, as the recent ceremonials in Fairmount,
Indiana, testify.
It was thought in those days that Hollywood
and the stars were indeed immortal. Tinseltown
was the ultimate dream factory, and the stars were
our reigning pantheon of gods. Alas, immortality
is hard to sustain, and Hollywood was beset in
subsequent decades by forces which seemed to
threaten the movies-television was only the first
technological innovation that disturbed the
Olympian order. As each new way of viewing
came about-the invention of the VCR, cable
movie channels, downloading movies off the
Internet, and so on- all threatened movie going.
And yet movie going survives, and despite drops
in attendance when moviemakers make a string of
lousy flicks, the multiplexes thrive. Many small
towns where "the last picture show" dosed now
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have profitable and busy multi-screen theatres
wherein thousands tum out weekly to see the latest movie on the silver screen.
From the larger view of the early twenty-first
century, we can look back on the over centurylong history of the movies and see some patterns
that might assist us in our own movie going.
Looking back on the origins and development of
the movies, the first thing one is struck with is that
they were new, but not so new. The movies had
been preceded by various kinds of moving pictures, such as the famous magic lantern, but they
brought a larger and more urgent immediacy to
the tricks of magic and the stage show. What was
happening on that screen looked real, but it was
more than real. It was a heightened and larger
reality which offered vicarious transport for audiences ready for imaginative mobility. However,
the universality of popular appeal meant that
movies had to meet some of the expectations of
popular entertainment. The imaginative power of
movies quickly was grounded in narrative tradition. The movies told familiar stories, only with
more visual power and agility than hitherto possible. We now look at many of the early silents as
excessively melodramatic or aesthetically crude,
even though their contemporary audiences largely
did not think so. Entertain us with your cinematic
tricks, they asked, but in narrative forms with
which we are comfortable.
O AT THE INCEPTION, MOVIEMAKERS LEARNED

S

all the visual gimmicks we became used to.
They inherited their conventions and narrations from storytelling, but learned to use them in
their own compelling way. The Western was the
stuff of nineteenth-century dime novels and Wild
West shows, but it doesn't really come alive until
you can see the classic tales unfold in that spectacular movie country of imaginary pictorial power
-the stagecoach winding through Monument

Valley, the cattle drivers discovering the railroad
tracks leading to Abilene, Shane descending from
the Grand Tetons like a god. The genres of film
became a tradition, and if after awhile viewers
began to think they had seen this story before,
they had. It was these variations on familiar
themes that kept genres alive, and when they were
exhausted, they would almost disappear. The
Western almost vanished for adults in the 1930s,
and the musical was lost to view in the 1960s. Yet
such movie genres show amazing resilience.
Westerns and musicals are still made, and often
enjoy box office and critical success. One of the
keys to the survival of the movies is genre flexibility, their amazing ability to make the old new
again. The travails and perils of young love are a
troubadour's tale, but you can see that old, old
story played out once again at the nearest movie
theater.
At every stage of their history, there has been
much intellectual grousing about how the movies
don't live up to their potential and hand wringing
about how many lousy movies are made. As long
as the movies are a popular art, they will try to
cater to changing and less than exalted tastes. A
glance at Leonard Maltin's plot synopses will
reveal how many dreary or sleazy movies have
been made in the past. Even though there are conventional restraints on mainstream movies, someone is always trying to censor the movies, and various observers recurrently decry the low state, or
subversive state, of the movie art. Throughout
their history, the movies have been accused of
"glorifying" something: war, gangsters, sexual
freedom, drugs, bourgeois normalcy, an ideology,
the latest fads and fashions, you name it. Such
"glorifications" are usually in the mind of the
critic. The legend still survives that in the 1930s
and 1940s left-wing Hollywood screenwriters
somehow inserted pro-communist propaganda
into the movies they wrote. They were so effective
that they sneaked it through the elaborate studio
system and watchdogs like Jack Warner and Louis
B. Mayer. Even movie audiences were totally
unaware of it, not to mention the folks who ran
Comintern,
which regularly
condemned
Hollywood as producing bourgeois tripe. Their
propaganda, it seems, succeeded by being totally
invisible. Such subversive "themes" are found

because they are sought, but it is a tribute to the
perceived social power of the movies that someone is always finding invisibilities in the visible.

A

LAS, IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT GOOD MOVIES-

admittedly a vague aesthetic judgmentare so seldom found because they are so
seldom sought. By good movies, I mean meaty
stuff for adults. I do not necessarily mean the classics, or avant-garde, or "art films." I have in mind
accessible movies that try to deal with something
that takes some degree of maturity to understand
and appreciate. In a country that is notorious for
its immaturity, such fare often comes and goes
quickly at the average cinemall. The worst habits
of moviemaking-the copycat principle, the loss
of nerve, waves of fads, appeal to juvenile mentalities-make looking for good movies something of
a task. The current wave of television programs
turned into movies-Bewitched, The Dukes of
Hazzard, and so on endlessly- are still television,
small-screen and small-minded tales appealing to
familiarity and predictability. This is not to say
that borrowing from outside or previous sources
is always bad. The current thriller Flight Plan is
obviously ripped off from Hitchcock's The Lady
Vanishes, but the intriguing mystery works in both
films.
The good movies we should seek are not necessarily at the margins or only seeable in the local
"arts array" series. Actually, if we want mature
fare, we can find it at the center. Clint Eastwood's
last two films-Mystic River and Million Dollar
Baby-strike me as exemplary for my loose criterion. They deal with people who are quite ordinary
but identifiably complex, tasked with the burden
of their past imported into the present, and faced
with events which are problematic and less than
happy. In other words, the "surface realism" of
such movies is utilized to portray a world where
the usual easy answers and predictable outcomes
don't apply. Movies with larger social themes that
ensnare identifiable "round" characters can be
found too. For example, The Constant Gardener
shows us people enmeshed in a world where
power cynically exploits poverty and shows the
very real personal consequences for those who
question the machinations of the powerful (in this
case, Big Pharma, a current conspiratorial villain

-

of choice). And in Lord of War, a very candid international arms dealer gives us a tour into the ghastly world of illicit weapons made easily available to
anyone who can pay. The movie transforms this
grim practice into a comic grotesque, including a
hilarious paean to the Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle
which sustains "militants" everywhere (and
indeed, may be a more important military innovation than the atom bomb or the guided missile).
Both movies portray a world without comforting
redemptions and characters that are too human to
be anything but what they are and do, very much
like those of us in the dark watching them. These
two contemporary movies invite hard questions.
The first suggests that the world is becoming more
sinister, and the second that the world is becoming
more preposterous.
I TIITNK, TO UNDERSTAND MOVIES, OR
for that matter any medium, as something of a
social movement which mobilizes resources
and diffuses communications in a way that alters
our way of seeing the world. The movies certainly
have done that, so much so that our imaginative
universe has been enriched in the process. But the
danger now to the movies is not overpricing, or
bad scripts, or corporate imbeciles. Rather it is
supercession, the possibility that movies will be
superseded by visual media which can be accessed
by means other than going to the movie theater.
This last summer, people watched more DVDs and
fewer movies, and there are many venues on the
Internet where one can watch a movie on the computer. But like the VCR cassettes many readers are
familiar with, something important is missing: bigness, the stature and breadth of mythic adequacy
which the movies more than any other medium
have given us. The big screen of the movie theater
gave us a sweeping and breathtaking vision of the
world, which the small screen makes look minute
and limited. The wonder of the movies is that they
portray a world of magnification, not diminution.
The big screen is a public experience for groups of
people sharing that largeness; the little screen is a
private experience for individuals or small groups
sharing that smallness.
We may fondly hope that in the future somehow we will continue to seek out and enjoy what is
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called "the movie experience." The technology is
now developing so that the larger view accorded
us by movies is increasingly available. (My local
cinemall is running a long series of classic films on
the big screen. You haven't lived until you've seen
Lawrence of Arabia in the full glory of its magnitude.) If we appreciate the movies, we all have a
stock of films we love to see again and again, and
seeing them fully projected, as they were intended
to be, is a sheer delight. It is said of Susan Sontag
that even to the end of her life she had a repertoire
of about four hundred films which she watched
again and again, once telling an audience that these
movies were enduring passions. I agree. Age cannot wither, nor custom stale the infinite variety of
the movies we love. I can watch the recognition
scene in Chinatown or the seduction scene in The
Graduate or the final scene in City Lights with everrenewable wonder and wish that generations to
come will appreciate and share the joy of the movie
experience. We may hope that there are no last picture shows.
In his memoir of Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Norman Malcolm recounts that the terribly intense
Wittgenstein was exhausted but disappointed by
his lectures. At the end, with everyone leaving, he
would often implore someone, "Could you go to a
flick?" He could forget his philosophical agonies
by immersing himself in a movie, insisting that
they sit in the first row. He watched the movie, no
matter how dull or trivial, with the same intensity
he gave to philosophy, except his complete absorption in the film made him forget the questions
which were his life's work. He once whispered to
Malcolm, "This is like a shower bath!" Movie
lovers know what he meant. We are like worshipful parishioners totally attentive to the ritual drama
unfolding before us in the dark, and we love our
faith for the baptism of total immersion it offers us.
The flicks may be a Gnostic heresy, but the faithful
who attend to the kingdom of shadows know they
are in touch with something transcendent. f

Jame Combs is a former Valparaiso Univeristy faculty
member who now lives in the Virginia woods, surrounded by various woodland animals, seven cats, and Sara.
He's not complaining.
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tbis day In bistory
a few honest words
Albert Louis Zambone
HERE WAS NO WAY FOR BISHOP JAMES MADISON

T

to know the effect of the words that he
spoke in honest answer to a student's
thoughtful question. That is the way of historical
events; it is also the way of teaching. Any infinite
number of things can lead to another infinite number of outcomes. For the teacher, however, the
surest way to exercise contingent influences is
through words spoken honestly and truly.
The student was Edward Coles, a young man
from Nelson County in central Virginia. His family
owned land throughout the northern part of the
county, including a tract along the Rockfish River,
which still flows down from the heart of the Blue
Ridge. Coles was far from home, studying at the
College of William and Mary in Williamsburg,
once the small yet grand capital of a vast Virginia
that stretched from the Atlantic to the Great Lakes
and the Mississippi. Now Williamsburg, like the
state, was sadly reduced in size and wealth.
Bishop Madison, a cousin of the Virginian
statesman and future President of the same name,
had been President of William and Mary since 1777.
An ardent patriot, the future Bishop served as
Captain of a Williamsburg militia company. By
Anglican canon law, this should have led to a
forcible laicization; however, not only did Madison
remain an Anglican minister, but in 1790, he was
consecrated as the first Anglican Bishop of Virginia
by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Trained originally as a lawyer after his own graduation from
William and Mary, he was appointed to be both
President as well as Professor of Mathematics at the
college. He must have been skilled in the subject,
for he was one of the principal members of the commission that re-mapped the Mason-Dixon Line, the
border between Maryland and Pennsylvania.
Moreover, he created the first map of Virginia since
Jefferson and Fry's survey in the 1740s.
While Madison seems on the account of subsequent historians of the Episcopal Church in

Virginia to have been a much less successful
bishop than man of science, he was able to tell the
truth. When Edward Coles asked him if slavery in
Virginia was justified, Madison said to him what
he never dared to write. No, Madison told Coles, it
could not be justified. Slavery was not rightfully
done, and it existed only because it had been so
long in Virginia that it would be difficult to be rid
of it.
In 1808, Coles inherited his family's plantation
on the Rockfish River in Albemarle County,
Virginia: 782 acres with twenty slaves, nine of
them children. Apparently it was at that time that
he determined, somehow, to emancipate them. But
events conspired to delay his plans. From 1809 to
1815, he was private secretary to President
Madison. In 1816, he was part of a delegation to
the Russian Imperial Court in St. Petersburg.
During this time, his slaves remained in bondage
on the Rockfish plantation.
But Coles had not forgotten Bishop Madison's
words. On Aprill, 1819, he began a trip westward.
He had determined that he would immigrate to
Illinois, and take his slaves with him. This he did
against the advice of his venerated Albemarle
County neighbor Thomas Jefferson, who attempted to dissuade Cole from his plan.
Coles was undeterred by the Sage of
Monticello. He bought land in Illinois, and sold his
lands in Virginia. Then he marched his property
up the Valley of Virginia and across the
Appalachians to Pittsburgh, where they all began
their voyage to a new future.
Not until they were all floating down the Ohio
in flatboats did Coles reveal to his slaves that they
were free as of that moment. " .. .I commenced by
saying it was time for me to make known to them
what I intended to do with them ... " he subsequently wrote. "I proclaimed in the shortest and
fullest manner possible, that they were no longer
Slaves, but free-free as I was, and were at liberty to

proceed with me, or to go ashore at their pleasure.
The effect on them was electrical. In breathless
silence they stood before me, unable to utter a
word, but with countenances beaming with
expression which no words could convey, and
which no language can now describe." There is a
lovely folk painting that shows Coles, a lone white
man on a vast raft, surrounded by rejoicing people
who were now free.
Coles was determined not only to free his
slaves, but to establish them properly in their new
lives. On arrival in southern Illinois, he gave each
family a deed to 160 acres of prairie. He too settled
in Illinois, beginning a new life as a farmer without the benefit of slave labor. Three years after his
arrival, he was elected governor of the Illinois
Territory.
Thus began the most important of his public
periods of office. As governor of the Illinois
Territory, he suppressed the importation of slave
labor into Illinois from the South, and at the ratification of statehood he successfully fought to preserve Illinois as a free state. He thereby almost single-handedly stopped the spread of slavery into
the Old Northwest, which, according to the act of
1784 drafted by Coles's old neighbor, Thomas
Jefferson, was supposed to remain free soil. Had
slavery taken hold in Illinois, it is possible that
Illinois might have become a slave state simply by
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default. The result of that counterfactual is almost
too wild to consider.
Coles was one of a number of Virginians who,
wishing to free their slaves, were forced to leave
their native state in order to do so. While Coles
was on the very elite end of the social scale, there
were others of more humble social origins who
were moved by their faith to do much the same
thing. The majority of these seem to have been
Primitive Baptists who moved northwest out of
Virginia (or Kentucky, which often had been their
first place of settlement after leaving the Old
Dominion) into Ohio and Indiana. One of these
was Thomas Lincoln, the father of Abraham.
Others were Methodists like Thomas Worthington
of Berkeley County who in the 1790s, when that
growing denomination was still opposed to the
institution of slavery, left Virginia for Ohio rather
than live in a state where slavery was tolerated.
All left for their own reasons, to be sure, and
these reasons included many besides their abhorrence of slavery. In the case of Edward Coles it was
the honest words of a teacher who never said or
wrote such words publicly, who probably never
dreamed of doing such a thing. The words that
Bishop Madison spoke in a classroom to an
enquiring student, words spoken in a moment of
honesty, made all the difference. f
Al Zambone lives deep in the heart of Virginia.

[iction
what is America? Mark Helprin's Freddy and Fredericka

Ken Masugi
[In America] he had discovered that the aim-point of the impossible is the best aim-point of all. He had made his way
with only the princess at his side and no advantage other than that which was within them. In America he had
learned to be a king, not least because in America he discovered the sacred principle that every man is a king (552).
Mark Helprin. Freddy and Fredericka. New York:
Penguin Press, 2005.

T

HIS IS A COMIC NOVEL ABOUT TWO UGLY CHAR-

acters-Freddy and Fredericka, a.k.a.
Prince Charles and Princess Di-who
become beautified by a long march through democratic America. Their education through
American experiences-work, political involvement, immersion in wilderness-brings forth their
true natures. As in Plato, the good, America,
becomes the new definition of the beautiful. Such
argumentation, that utilitarian America might
beautify the aristocracy, runs counter to Alexis de
Tocqueville's classic portrayal of democratic
America to an ambivalent France. But this particularly vulnerable aristocracy requires such education. America turns out to contain nobility of soul
that enables the royal couple to be true rulers of
Britain. In tum, the true aristocratic legacy in
Freddy calls America back to its best purposes.
Once Americanized, Freddy and Fredericka reflect
the best about aristocratic men and women and
their democratic counterparts. From Silly and
Snobby they become manly and womanly. There
is something about America that corrects British
corruptions of the pseudo-aristocracy. In the
course of this education, the reader encounters
faithful servants, eccentric royalty, scheming
media giants, and politicians, all embraced by a
bizarre "magical realism" that sees Merlin become
(switching not just letters) a common "Mr. Neil."
This is not a novel about the monarchy or
court politics. Its first and last lines are worth
recalling here: "Though it is hard to be a king, it is
harder yet to become one" (1). Its last words:
"Everyone is interested, it is said, in kings, but I

myself am interested in kings before their time.
For kings before their time are like us all, and may
God bless them for that, and save them, too" (553).
"Kings before their time." Helprin is interested in the British monarchy not only because he
believes in Anglo-American union, but ultimately
because he believes in the power of virtue. Virtue
is the only basis for the love and honor at the heart
of all Helprin novels.
Why does Helprin think that monarchy matters? Only because visible virtue matters. Political
deeds matter. And Freddy/Charles does not disappoint in manly acts of physical courage, grasp of
technology, and statesmanship. Unless the expectation of virtue is met, the moral order collapses.
In the face of such perils, we require both confidence in good instincts and a sense of humor. Thus
the novel is Twain and Trollope. It is the Prince and
the Pauper set in the contemporary United States. It
is The Pallisers set across the water, over a century
later.
But knowing the depths of the novel requires
more than just noting parallels. The novel is narrated by a character who heard about the events of
the novel during Freddy's hypnotic sessions while
he memorized, read, and recited "backward the
Karachi Yellow Pages at high speed, all the while
simulating with intense bodily jerkings the paroxysmal death struggle of a salt-water game fish."
The narrator has "taken some liberties of narration" (2). We readers are invited to complete the
tale ourselves, by retelling it to those who can imitate its highest aspirations, the ultimate
addressees of Helprin's novels.
Can the poet correct or refashion history? The
real Mark Helprin could not have revived Bob
Dole's presidential campaign. Helprin wrote

speeches for the now-Viagra spokesman's ill-fated
1996 presidential campaign, including his brilliant
speech resigning from the Senate. Yet chance and
art can combine to produce the best regime-at
least in speech. Helprin is bolder than Tocqueville
(whose bicentennial we celebrate this year) in
what he makes of America.
The preposterous names and inane wordplays (Freddy's mistress Lady Boylinghotte) are
intended to produce an atmosphere of frivolity to
accompany serious speculation on the modem
world. This moderates Helprin's most didactic
novel. Ultimately, the purpose of the novel is
comic, in the sense that the world can be redeemed
by virtuous action, the purposeful actions of
Americans and British together.
Freddy and Fredericka may be said to elevate
Tocqueville's argument about the AngloAmericans by showing how noble they can be and
thus how virtue can survive in a democratic age.
Helprin saves the best of the Old World, the world
of Marlborough, Shakespeare, and Locke, by
reviving it through the New. The aristocratic
Freddy and Fredericka use the examples of
Lincoln as well as what was best in their own lineage to succeed.
At the Lincoln Memorial, a then-homeless
Freddy and Fredericka gaze on Lincoln's face:
"Of all the kings of England, none was
half as noble. Nor Nelson, nor Wellington,
nor Marlborough, nor Churchill."
"In the middle of this crazed, materialistic, common country, where the lowest
of the low is turned up by the strong currents of progress and rides upon the glittering surface of national life more buoyantly than an aristocrat; in the midst of all
this that I thought so unimpressiveGypsies, Cadillacs, houses with flat
roofs-we have been outdone by the visage of a peasant, a soul speaking through
marble, in a history not our own."
"Who is that?" Fredericka asked.
"Lincoln."
"He's the one who shot Kennedy?" (255)
Later we see the real princess (a descendant of
the Duke of Marlborough) emerge, while cleaning
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public restroom toilets. But the political adventures of Freddy show him at his best.
Freddy, by virtue of having successfully
passed himself off as a dentist, is recruited by the
desperate Republican candidate for President,
Senator Dewey Knott. He is hopelessly behind
President Self in the polls, but Freddy's candor
makes Knott competitive. Freddy is willing to
demand the best of Americans. He has seen them
work and sacrifice-one even gives her life for him.
Speaking before the Republican convention (I
omit some important part of the plot as not to spoil
it for the reader), Freddy-Helprin denounces current politics and affirms the best possibilities for
America and the West:
"I think the model of a president
should be a man who comes before you
and says, 'This is what I have seen, this is
what I believe, this is how I live, and this
is what I love' ....
"I have read your Declaration and
your Constitution, and though at first I
found the former personally injurious, I
came to see that these are lucid and perfect documents, and that if you return to
them as faithfully as they have served you
since the beginning, they will not fail you.
"You have neglected them, and are
unclear about the duties of a citizen and
what comes by right. You seem to have
forgotten the ancient battles in which you
prevailed, and, more importantly, those
that you merely survived. You seem to
have forgotten that your original principles arose in a land that was carpeted with
virgin stands of trees, and that the principles by which you lived-immaterial and
bright, ever enduring-grew up just as
strong and fresh. Return to them. They are
waiting for you, as are reserves of honour
as vast as the stands of trees that once
spread without end ....
"I was born to be a king, and you were
born not to have one. America does not
need and cannot have a king, for it is
majestic in itself as perhaps no country
has ever been. And its greatest majesty is
not the splendid landscape or the long

and sunny coasts, not the Mississippi or
the snows of the Pacific Crest. Its greatest
majesty, its gift to the world, is that it has
carried out God's will to make each man a
king, subservient only to Him. From the
beginning, this has been the underlying
force of every footfall, smile, and blink of
the eye in this country. It, and not your
power, is what has lifted you up, is what
distinguishes you from others, and has
made you the leader of the world"
(496-500).

Union. "In America he had learned to be a king,
not least because in America he discovered the
sacred principle that every man is a king" (552).
Churchill said on coming to leadership at the
beginning of World War II: "Facts are better than
dreams." But dreams such as Helprin's make us
better appreciate how we might mold those facts
that become our lives. f

After several months in America, Freddy and
Fredericka reemerge in London (having returned,
everyone else thought, from a brief vacation in
Pakistan). We are told that Freddy eventually
assumes the throne, leads the nation through troubles and in wars, and forms an Anglo-American

Ken Masugi is Director of the Center for Local
Government of the Claremont Institute. His latest book,
co-edited with John Marini, is The Progressive
Revolution in Politics and Political Science (2005).
He is currently working on two books on multiculturalism and American citizenship.

WORD, INCARNATE
Words sicken when the pulse
Of deeds beats low in them.
We grow confused
When all our noble words lie, dying,
Because they're not transfused
With sacrifice.
Even the first Word
Who, in the beginning burst
Life's glory open as God spoke it,
Bid to be heard
When in silence he took up death
And broke it.

Charles Strietelmeier

pulpit and pew
Christmas Eve 2004
Thomas C. Willadsen

I

N MY FAMILY, WE HAVE A CHRISTMAS EVE TRADI-

tion- Chinese food for supper. This all started
years ago when my grandmother refused to
cook on Christmas Eve, because she had to make a
big breakfast, big midday-meal, and suppertime
snacks of the leftovers on Christmas. She went on
strike every Christmas Eve. Grandpa always had
to work late and forgot his annual obligation.
Annually, Ho Toy Loon Main Street, the only open
restaurant between his office and home, saved
him.
This Christmas Eve my wife went on strike at
3:00 p.m. She'd been cooking all day. I'd been
doing dishes and running interference with our
boys, Peter-8, David-3. They were two live wires.
"McDonald's for supper," Mary announced.
David, a vegetarian, would only eat the french
fries, but the rest of us would be filled, if not nourished, by a rare fast food supper. First, we had to
visit the pair of cats we were taking care of. We
stopped by their house about 4:15 to feed, water,
clean their boxes, and play with them. Tabby and
Sandy are ready purrers and very affectionate. We
left a few minutes before 5:00 and arrived at Mu
Delta at 5:01, just as they were locking up for their
long winter's nap.
No problem, Burger King is less than a mile
away. Problem: Burger King also closed early, as
did Pizza Hut and both supermarkets on our end
of town. We were left with getting food from the
only business open anywhere near us, Eastside
Amoco, known in our family as "Gas-0 'n'
Treats." (We'd entered this name in a contest to
name the store two years ago. We didn't win.) Gas0 is as close to a comer grocery store as exists in
this modem age. The staff is nice and the clientele
are all regulars.
As we drove there from the last shuttered
supermarket the Packers won their game on a lastsecond field goal. When we got to Gas-0, there
was a long line of people who had been waiting to
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get their smokes and batteries until the game
ended. We bought our two dollar frozen cheese
pizza and bottle of orange pop and headed home,
much later than Mary expected.
"Next time ..." she started.
"Next time we're out on Christmas Eve and
can't find food, I should give up right away?"
We were a little tense. I'd hoped to get to
church by 6:00 for the evening service. The pizza,
Orv's, was not our usual brand. It was a little thinner and had more of a chemical taste, but we ate it
all and I made it to church in time to go over my
sermon once and get things ready for the holy day.
We had a guest organist, as we've had for
nearly two years, since our organist died suddenly
one Sunday morning. This guy was good. During
the distribution of the bread he played some of the
background music from the Charlie Brown
Christmas special. I mentioned the special, as I do
most Christmas Eves, because it ends with Linus
reciting the lesson from Luke's gospel. It is very
familiar for that reason.
OR THE PAST TEN YEARS OUR LAY READER HAS

F

been a morning drive DJ for one of the local
radio stations. He's everybody's friend, the
sort of man you call "Slugger" the moment you
meet him. Since he DJ's for a lot of wedding receptions, he sleeps late Sunday mornings and is rarely
able to attend worship, but he's always free to be
lay reader on Christmas Eve. He does a marvelous
job. And he always has jokes for me.
Two fish in a tank, one says "I'll drive, you
man the gun."
What did the fish say when it swam into a
wall? Dam.
What do you call a fish with no eyes? Fsh.
This year I had one for him: Man dies and goes
to heaven. He asks St. Peter if he can speak with
the Virgin Mary. Pete looks into it. A little while

later St. Peter shows the man to the Virgin Mary's
office. The man asks, "Every time I see you depicted in paintings or sculptures, you're never smiling. You've got a look of wonder, or awe, or fear on
your face. Did the artists get that right? Why don't
you look happy?"
"I wanted a girl."
There is a little confusion about lighting the
Advent wreath. It's being lit by four people, all of
whom were born on different continents. The
European, age 6, and his Asian-born brother, 2,
will be accompanied by their North Americanborn, adoptive father. The other Asian and the
South American need to divvy up the speaking
part.
As the lay reader begins the Old Testament
Lesson, Psalm 96, "Sing a new song..." an infant I
baptized over the summer begins to cry. "There's a
new song!" Chuck ad-libs. It was perfect. After the
New Testament lesson, I expect him to say something like, "Traffic's next, after this message from
Druck's Heating and Air Conditioning!" instead
of, "This is the word of the Lord."
The elder who serves the choir forgets to serve
Chuck and me. We're whispering "Psst, Keith,
psst, Keith!" Finally, someone in the choir prompts
Keith to serve us. Keith walks across the chancel
and offers the bread to me. "Thanks be to God," I
say as I always do when celebrating the sacrament. "Thanks, Keith," Chuck adds. This is the
kind of thing Keith will feel bad about, but to me
it is as serious as not passing the potatoes on to
Aunt Pat at Thanksgiving.
During the Great Prayer of Thanksgiving, I
screw up the opening litany. I say, "It is right to
give our thanks and praise," which the congregation is supposed to say, after I've said, "Let us give
thanks to the Lord our God." We're all confused
momentarily. Then I say, "My bad. Let's try that
again, Let us give thanks to the Lord our God."
They chime in with the correct response and I tell
them they are the smartest Presbyterian church in
Oshkosh.
At the invitation, I point out that people will
come from all directions, just as our candle
lighters for tonight came from different conti-

nents, because the Good News we celebrate
tonight is for "all peoples." So, of course, everyone
was invited to share the sacrament with us.
As we stand to sing the closing hymn, "Silent
Night," (It's the law: you must close the Christmas
Eve service with "Silent Night.") Chuck says, "I
am having a stroke." He's a cut up, so I figure he's
pulling my leg. But no, he's really serious. Then I
point out he's trying to read the German lyrics. He
feels much better. After we walk out the center
aisle at the end of the service, I check my watch. It
reads 8:32. Pretty good for a service with communion, additional special music, a guest organist, and
communion. Chuck gives me a high five.
People always linger after a Christmas Eve
service, even though we don't offer coffee and
cookies as we do following Sunday worship. On
Christmas Eve, the grown children of the congregation who are making their annual pilgrimages
home catch up with their peers and show off their
children. It's lovely, but I want to get home,
because of three little words, "Some assembly
required."
David is excited because "Santa is coming and
Gram is going to sleep at our house tonight!"
I spend a few minutes talking to the recent
seminary graduate who will fill the pulpit the following Sunday. I realize that she'll probably have
her own call next year and not be able to preach
here. I tell her about a wedding I did a few weeks
ago in which I quoted both Glen Campbell and
The Smiths in my homily.
"No way!" she exclaims.
"Way!" I respond. Then I tum off the sound
system and the chancel lights and head home,
having put on the holiday for another year.
It was a pretty good service. The sanctuary
was lovely, the music was glorious, the last minute
difficulties, always present, were dealt with. Only
as I was falling to sleep did I realize that I didn't
once say, "Jesus" in the sermon, and I didn't get an
egg roll. Oh well, maybe next year. f

The Reverend Thomas C. Willadsen pastors First
Presbyterian Church in Oshkosh, Wisconsin.

ethics
parents forever
Gilbert Meilaender
UITE A FEW YEARS AGO, WHEN

Q

I WAS STILL

teaching at Oberlin College, the father of
a student for whom I was faculty advisor
telephoned me one day in my office. He was, he
said, flying from his horne halfway across the
country to Oberlin, and he wanted an appointment to talk with me about his son's decision to
become a religion major.
That young man had not come to Oberlin
intending to major in religion. Indeed, almost no
student ever did, nor were they required to take
any religion courses. But, given the opportunity to
elect courses of interest from the very start of his
college career, this student-like quite a few others-had been drawn in. Having taught him and
come to know him a little, I had agreed to become
his advisor when he declared his major.
His decision clearly bothered his father, a
tough-minded physicist who could see little point
in a religion major. His concern wasn't primarily
that he thought religion a useless major when it
carne to future employment, though he may have
thought that as well. He simply thought there
were many subjects on which his son's time would
be better spent.
He wanted to understand. He wanted to talk
with me about what a religion major involved,
about why one might pursue it, whether it could
make sense to do so. He'd come because he cared
deeply about his son and didn't want him to make
a terrible mistake. So he wanted to talk, to understand, and to come to terms with a choice that by
his lights seemed foolish.
I thought this was terrific. That a father should
care so much about his son's decisions that he
would want to come and take my time discussing
it struck me- and strikes me still- as a wonderful
thing, which I could only welcome. That he wanted his son to get things right, and that he was by
no means certain that the faculty (or his son's faculty advisor!) would be all that wise about such
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matters, that he had to come and see and inquire
for himself-all that seemed exactly right. I have
never forgotten the impression it made upon me,
and it is one of my favorite memories from thirty
years of teaching. Moreover, it forced me to think
more carefully about two deeply moral relationships-that of father to son and that of teacher to
student.
I have called to mind this occasion more than
once of late when I have heard comment about the
phenomenon now labeled "helicopter parents."
These are parents who hover. They do not simply
send their children off to college but remain in
close contact with those children. They have questions for the professors teaching their children, for
faculty advisors, and for administrators. Most of
the comments I hear about these copter parents
take the form of complaint and criticism about
them.
On the whole, I find that I can share neither
the complaint nor the criticism. I'm told, for example, that such parenting displays an inability to let
go of one's children, an unwillingness to allow
children to fend for themselves. Now, we can stipulate that conscientious parents may sometimes
hover too much and stifle a child. Let's grant that
a cell phone call every few hours is probably overdoing "staying in touch." But I cannot believe that
in an age that has celebrated autonomy and selfdetermination in destructive ways, an age in
which we have deliberately structured life in ways
that strain family ties and encourage us to think of
individuals simply as isolated and self-interested,
that in such an age our top priority should be that
parents let children fend for themselves. On the
contrary, we should be delighted when we see
signs that the corrosive individualism which characterizes so much of our culture has not succeeded in producing parents who don't much care how
their children manage the first time they leave
horne for an extended period of time.

Sometimes, though, the moral flaw of such
parents is described in different terms. It's not that
these parents can't let go of their children. Rather,
it's that these parents-coming, for the most part,
from the narcissistic Baby Boomer generationalways have questioned authority and want to
question it still. And now that their children are off
at college, the authorities whom they want to
question are their children's teachers, advisors,
and administrators. Here again, let's stipulate that
the Baby Boomers are probably far from the most
virtuous of generations, and that they (we!) can be
insufferably self-centered.
Nonetheless, this argument is certainly striking and intriguing-especially when put forward
by faculty and administrators at colleges and universities. After all, who-according to this argument-are the "authorities" who are being questioned and who (evidently) should not be so questioned? Why it's the faculty and administrators, of
course. That they should fall into the trap of thinking of themselves as authorities, suited to step into
the lives of these young people at the time their
parents are gracefully to recede, tells us a good bit
about their image of themselves.
But it is an image we ought to question, an
image the parents of our students do well to question. It is by no means obvious that a Ph.D. in an
academic discipline makes any of us a wise or
good guide for the choices students should make
about the course their lives will take, what they
should believe, or what they should value. In fact,
part of the problem with what happens in many
classrooms in colleges and universities-certainly
part of the problem with the way my own discipline, religion, is often taught-is that we faculty
too often suppose we are there not simply to teach
the subject matter of our discipline (a task for
which we presumably have some training and

competence) but also to shape the souls of our students (a task for which we may be ill-suited and
which, in any case, is a misuse of our role in the
classroom). And it is at least as hard to think of
reasons why parents should suppose that midlevel administrators at colleges and universitiesthe folks who run orientation programs and oversee student and residential life-are any better
suited or qualified than parents themselves to give
guidance and advice about decisions their children will make.
Those who teach at and those who administer
our colleges and universities should probably get
down on their knees daily, giving thanks for the
touching faith of parents that continues to move
them to send their children (with accompanying
checks) off to study with us. In exchange, we
should welcome the concern- and the questions-of these parents. We should be glad when
we see signs of parental affection and concern. We
should practice a kind of self-denying restraint,
especially in the classroom, when we are tempted
to subvert or mock the beliefs our students bring
with them from their homes or when we are
tempted to imagine that we have been asked not
just to train the minds of our students but also to
form their character.
All honor to the memory of that father who
came to see me years ago in Oberlin. He is, I happen to know, no longer alive, but I like to think he
would be pleased and proud-even if still affectionately concerned- to know that his son now has
a Ph.D. in religious ethics and is himself a college
professor. A professor, I trust, who is always ready
to hear from the parents of those he teaches. f

Gilbert Meilaender teaches theology and ethics at
Valparaiso University.

things catholic
advent of a new attitude for evaluating war?

Tobias Winright

T

HE ADVENT SEASON ON THE LITURGICAL CAL-

endar is a time when Christians prepare to
remember Jesus Christ's birth at Christmas,
but it also is the occasion for Christians to anticipate and get ready for Christ's return. We believe
that someday the kingdom of God that Jesus
embodied and inaugurated will come, as we pray
in the Lord's Prayer, and be established fully "on
earth as it is in heaven." Only then will there truly
be "peace on earth, good will toward all." In the
meantime, we Christians proleptically experience
this kingdom way of life as we worship, pass the
peace of Christ, and go forth in peace to love and
serve the Lord in a world still wounded by sin.
Sounds fairly straightforward enough, doesn't
it? However, when conflict erupts due to the continuing presence of sin, may Christians ever resort
to the use of force, including killing, in order to
restore or establish peace? If, for example, an
enemy, whom we are called to love, threatens an
innocent neighbor, whom we are also called to
love, what should we morally do?
This particular Advent season also occasions
for Roman Catholic Christians the fourtieth
anniversary of the official closing of the Second
Vatican Council (1962-1965). This gathering of the
world's Catholic bishops was initially convened by
Pope John XIII in order that the Church might
bring itself up to date, address contemporary
problems, and take part in the discussion of the
major questions of the day. One of the last documents promulgated by the Council was Gaudium
et Spes, "The Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the Modem World," which in its final section
addressed "The Fostering of Peace and the
Promotion of a Community of Nations" -an
appropriate topic given the Advent season during
which it was issued.
One of its most quoted lines called upon the
entire Church to "undertake an evaluation of war
with an entirely new attitude" (§80). However,
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four decades later, after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, a number of Christian ethicists are still searching for such a new attitude, as
evident in their calling into question the "war"
approach to dealing with terrorism. Of course,
many moral theologians continue to draw either
upon pacifism or just-war theory, the two traditional Christian ethical perspectives on political
violence, in order to evaluate the war on terrorism.
Yet, interestingly, both pacifist and just-war
Christian ethicists also have suggested that a
"police" approach would be ethically more appropriate.
I wish to reflect briefly on the legacy of Vatican
II on war and peace for Catholics and others fourty years later in our post-9/11 world. In short, did
it really mark an advent of a new attitude for evaluating war? And, would a police approach actually constitute such a novel perspective?
The Council's main reason for suggesting a
new attitude was, in the wake of two catastrophic
world wars, the development of "scientific
weapons" during the arms race of the Cold War
that "can inflict massive and indiscriminate
destruction far exceeding the bounds of legitimate
defense" (§80). Total warfare, which by its very
nature encompasses and indiscriminately harms
civilian population centers, was condemned
unequivocally by the bishops as a crime against
God and humanity. This was one of only two condemnations-the other being the condemnation of
abortion-to be found in the entire corpus of
Vatican II documents. Moreover, the Council presciently warned about terrorism as a new way of
waging such warfare.
At this point in the document, however, no
new approach for evaluating war really has been
offered, for the criticism about indiscriminate
destruction is based on the traditional just-war criterion of discrimination, which is also known as
non-combatant immunity. Accordingly, citizens

are not supposed to be directly and intentionally
targeted. The Council's use of this principle therefore is not evidence of the rejection of the just-war
tradition, even though its serious application
would evaluate much of modern warfare as
immoral.
IMILARLY, GIVEN THAT THE DANGER OF WAR

S

remains due to the continued presence of sin
in the world, the Council did not revoke the
traditional right of national self-defense: "As long
as the danger of war remains and there is no competent and sufficiently powerful authority at the
international level, governments cannot be denied
the right to legitimate defense once every means of
peaceful settlement has been exhausted" (§79).
Notice that here the Council was invoking the traditional just-war criteria of just cause (i.e., defense)
and last resort. Again, it does not appear that a
new approach for evaluating war was being
offered or employed.
The mode of reasoning found in traditional
just-war theory, with rules governing when and
how the use of force is employed justly, remains
evident here as well as in the Council's other
remarks in this section prohibiting wars that seek
to subjugate other nations and forbidding soldiers'
blind obedience to commands that violate these
principles. Obviously, these norms continue to
possess relevance, as seen in their invocation by
both those supporting and those criticizing the
U.S.-led war in Iraq and in the moral uproar that
arose condemning abuses such as those that
occurred at Abu Ghraib prison. Admittedly, the
criteria of the just-war tradition have been misused numerous times over the centuries; however,
a fundamental rule of thumb in Christian ethics is
that the abuse does not negate the use.
Still, these moral considerations offered by the
Council and still invoked today are not a new
approach for ethically evaluating war. They come
to us via the just-war tradition that in Christian
teaching traces back to the fourth century with
Saint Ambrose and Saint Augustine. In recent centuries, this mode of ethical reasoning about warfare, along with its rules of engagement, has also
become incorporated into international law.
Furthermore, subsequent Church documents-for
example, the United States Catholic Bishops' pas-

toral letter, The Challenge of Peace (1983), the
Vatican's Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994),
and the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the
Church (2005)- have continued to maintain a
nation's right to legitimate defense as long as it
adheres to these criteria. So, if they were not jettisoning just-war thinking completely, what did the
Council mean when it called for "an evaluation of
war with an entirely new attitude"?
Indeed, the Council did clear away some new
ground. It strongly emphasized that all Christians
work toward the establishment of peace. In this
vein, and in an unexpected departure from previous official Catholic teachings, the Council praised
those who renounce the use of violence and who
employ nonviolent methods in seeking justice and
peace. Although pacifism was normative in early
Christianity, this was the first time that a Church
council ever commended nonviolence as a way of
life for lay Catholics. Related to this, the Council
did another first by adding that governments
should make laws recognizing conscientious
objection. Moreover, the subsequent Church documents mentioned above have continued to
acknowledge and encourage nonviolence as a
legitimate way of life for Christians.

N

EVERTHELESS, THE COUNCIL DID NOT

replace the just-war approach with a
pacifist approach for evaluating war.
Official recognition of the latter perspective is certainly evidence of a new attitude, but it does not
seem to constitute an "entirely" new attitude. The
Council, however, did not stop their treatment of
war and peace there.
It went on to call for the abolition of war
through international institutions and law: "It is
our clear duty, then, to strain every muscle as we
work for the time when all war can be completely
outlawed by international consent" (§82). Here the
Council proposed the establishment of a universal
public authority having effective power to protect
a peaceful and just order in the international community. Beyond international laws, institutions,
and courts, the bishops seemed to suggest some
sort of international police capacity to enforce
such laws, to protect the peace, and to bring perpetrators to justice. This brings me back to the current appeals to a police approach by many

Christian ethicists today. Does this really represent
"an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude"?
I regard these more recent invocations of a
police model as curious, especially given that little
prior work has been done by Christian ethicists on
the topic of policing itself. Indeed, I find it strange
that these theologians are calling for a police
approach when hardly anyone has examined what
such a model might look like and entail, especially
with regard to the use of force. Twenty-one years
ago, I first began to wrestle with the question of
whether I should use force, especially lethal force,
when I applied for a job at various police departments that, when interviewing me, asked some
form of the following question: "Would you really,
if necessary, shoot someone?"
Simply put, though most of a police officer's
time is devoted to helping people in need, directing traffic, defusing domestic disputes, and other
services, there remains the possibility that force
will be required to protect lives from harm and to
apprehend offenders. Even in nations such as
Great Britain, where the police are relatively
unarmed, they still have this capacity to use force,
including lethal force, when necessary. Of course,
such police use of force must be in accordance
with strict guidelines-especially for the use of
lethal force. That is, it must be a last resort, proportionate, and discriminating. Also, deadly force
may be used only as a legitimate defense against a
grave and imminent threat to the officer's life or
the lives of other persons. Obviously, these rules
governing when and how the use of force is justified resemble the criteria of the just-war tradition.
To simply call for a police approach is not
enough. As the Rodney King beating by some Los
Angeles police officers in 1991 and the more recent
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incident with New Orleans police officers in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina demonstrate, not all
policing is just policing. There is, after all, such a
thing as police brutality and excessive force. So, if
Vatican II forty years ago and Christian ethicists
today propose outlawing war, they are right to
suggest also the need for some sort of international police institution to enforce this law. But this
might furthermore require the use of force, including lethal force, if a rogue nation or terrorist
organization breaks the law that outlaws war.
Thus there will be the ongoing need for rules governing when and how such force may be used by
such a policing entity. In my view, while this
would be new and better compared to nations unilaterally taking it upon themselves to defend
against the threats posed in today's world, a police
approach would still be more akin to the just-war
tradition, at least with regard to the criteria that
would need to govern when and how force would
be justified. Indeed, just-policing is the best exemplification of the just-war tradition.
As such, a police approach, like the older pacifist and just-war approaches, would not be a completely new way to evaluate war or the use of
force . Upon closer examination, however, the
Council called for a new attitude, not a new
approach, for evaluating war, and the current calls
for a police approach certainly evince the way in
which the Catholic Church and many Christian
ethicists in recent years share a strong presumption against war and take it seriously as an ethical
matter.f

Tobias Winright is a Roman Catholic moral theologian
who teaches at Saint Louis University.

MORNING SUN
Today the bedroom's dim cold
leads down the tunneled hall
into shocked brightness
after days of rainthe front room windows
stream their broad surprise,
like friends bursting in
with new flowers.
Outside, golden light
holds a dozing cat,
the drooping garden plantsrosemary, tomato, and basila potted geranium.
Chrome gleams from a car
backing into a street.
At the table, I settle
into my hot teacup.
Wholegrain toast,
fresh orange juice,
and- as if to name
this early sweetnesshoneydew.
While Mark lugs in patio plants
against predicted frost,
I read the dark, daily news:
two refugee girls weep
in the sunlight
for their small sister,
exploded by rocket fire;
a mother in town
finds her girl at dawn,
strangled with a phone cord.
Out west the lava dome
swells its eerie light.
The same sun, I tell
the brilliant window,
shines on them. Outside,
hoar fuzz on a windshield
softens in the light, as if wishing
could melt the cold away.

Carol Gilbertson

nation
the peril and promise of dual citizenship: part two

Jeanne M. Heffernan

I

N MY LAST COLUMN (TRINITY 2005), I EXPLORED ONE

of the difficulties contemporary citizens face as
members of two cities. Noting the problematic
assumptions that many, including Jeffrey Stout,
associate with the democratic ethos, I argued that
our political culture poses a danger to our primary
allegiance to Christ. Specifically, I underscored the
way in which individualism, considered by
Tocqueville a close counterpart to democratic
equality, undermines the tradition of Christian
discipleship.
Now if what Tocqueville observed in fact
reflects the inexorable logic of democracy, namely,
that it fosters social fragmentation, undermines all
hierarchical structures, and promotes the sovereign self, then the Christian-democratic synthesis
taken for granted at least in Catholic circles for the
last half-century requires serious re-evaluation.
Robert Kranak in his provocative book Christian
Faith and Modern Democracy (University of Notre
Dame Press, 2001) does just that, and his observations should give us pause. Kraynak argues that
modem liberal democracy rests upon a flawed
anthropological and political vision-evident in
its expansive schema of private rights-which
runs contrary to the basic assumptions of a
Christian world view. It has generated a host of ills
that threaten not only our political but also our
spiritual well-being. And those Christians who
have too readily embraced modem democracy
have, in his words, underestimated "the corrosive
effects of a culture of rights and the leveling effects
of mass democracy on the human soul and on the
institutions that are necessary to sustain a sense of
the sacred" (168). The democratic ethos championed by Stout faces a serious indictment on these
counts.
While Kraynak and other critics of the
Christian-democratic synthesis have rightly questioned whether traditional Christian beliefs and
the presuppositions of liberal democracy are com-
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patible, we ought not let the matter rest there.
Instead we need to ask whether Christianity is
compatible with democracy in its various forms,
for there have been different philosophical foundations behind the many instantiations of democracy, and these foundations have given rise to very
different practices. Surely the theoretical inspiration and activities of the French Republic under
the Jacobins differ in kind from the democracy
practiced by pious Christians in the New England
townships. Recall that Tocqueville described the
latter as embracing the spirit of liberty as well as
the spirit of religion. These good folks perceived a
basic difference between the church and the city,
between discipleship and democracy. For them,
Tocqueville noted, in the field of religion "everything is classified, systematized, foreseen, and
decided beforehand," whereas in the field of politics "everything is agitated, disputed, and uncertain. In the one is a passive though a voluntary
obedience; in the other, an independence scornful
of experience, and jealous of all authority." "These
two tendencies," he marveled, "apparently so discrepant, are far from conflicting; they advance
together and support each other." Whether or not
one subscribes to the Puritan understanding of
theology and politics recounted here, this example
of the pious Christian and ardent citizen at least
suggests that democratic institutions-when animated by a non-liberal anthropology-are not in
fundamental tension with the Christian faith.
Profound Christian thinkers of other persuasions have made robust arguments in this vein,
and we who recognize the danger in Stout's thesis
and the sober truth in Kraynak's, would do well to
revisit these arguments before abandoning the
democratic project. I would propose that the best
way to address the problems associated with
democracy, human rights, autonomy, and the like,
is not to abandon their usage but to clarify their
deepest meaning. This is a work of education

involving nothing less than a full-scale renovation
of our public philosophy.
In this regard, a relatively little-known source
comes to mind, the work of Yves R. Simon. Simon
was a twentieth-century Catholic philosopher and
French emigre whose reflections on politics,
ethics, and metaphysics repay careful study. While
on the faculty of the University of Chicago, Simon
delivered the prestigious Walgreen lectures, later
published as The Philosophy of Democratic
Government (republished by University of Notre
Dame Press, 1993). His argument helpfully clarifies the difference between a faulty and a sound
philosophical foundation for democracy. As to the
former, Simon perceives a common error in various flawed theories of democratic government,
namely, the dissolution of genuine political
authority in favor of an unconstrained popular
will-limited neither by governors nor by the naturallaw.
A Thomist, Simon grounds his alternative
defense of democracy in a Christian anthropology,
consciously avoiding the pitfalls of liberalism.
After appealing to Thomas, Cajetan, Bellarmine,
and Suarez for the basic groundwork of his argument, Simon states that he favors representative
democracy over other forms, because he thinks it
actualizes most effectively what Aquinas calls the
political (as opposed to despotic) nature of a
regime, since the governed have the institutional
means of resistance to bad government readily at
their disposal in the electoral process. It is right, he
insists, that democratic means be available to all.
Popular sovereignty and representative government imply a natural tendency toward universal
suffrage. "That the multitude in charge of selecting the governing personnel should comprise all
citizens follows from the nature of political society.
Other societies are built on the basis of exclusive
membership; not so the state, which is, by essence,
the concern of all" (87). Universal suffrage affords
the common man (who has little but strength of
numbers on his side) an indispensable form of
power to counterbalance the many advantages
possessed by elites. The people ought to retain this
power not only as a guard against tyranny. In
accord with the principle of subsidiarity (which
holds that when a task or decision can be satisfactorily achieved by the initiative of the individual

or small social units, it should be, so that the intellectual and moral capacities in such persons or
groups be developed most fully), they ought to
remain actively engaged in political decision-making at various levels of government.

I

T IS THIS KIND OF ACTIVE CITIZENRY THAT

Tocqueville glimpsed in the American townships. Struck by the stark contrast between the
average American citizen and his continental
counterpart, Tocqueville noted, "The native of
New England is attached to his township because
it is independent and free: his co-operation in its
affairs ensures his attachment to its interests; the
well-being it affords him secures his affection; and
its welfare is the aim of his ambition and of his
future exertions." Unlike Tocqueville's confreres,
described as so many tenants in a territory of a distant landlord, the American citizen exhibited a
kind of ownership of his political community, one
that summoned his care and sacrifice. "He takes a
part in every occurrence in the place; he practices
the art of government in the small sphere within
his reach; he accustoms himself to those forms
without which liberty can only advance by revolutions; he imbibes their spirit; he acquires a taste for
order, comprehends the balance of powers, and
collects clear practical notions on the nature of his
duties and the extent of his rights."
Tocqueville's self-governing citizen, though
initially tempted toward individualism, comes to
recognize his deep dependence on his fellows. He
is very far from the sovereign self rightly criticized
by Robert Kraynak. Likewise, the democratic citizen envisioned by Simon exercises an autonomy
that bears no resemblance to the liberal antinomianism Kraynak fears. Genuine autonomy, Simon
would say, is not the independent will exercising
indeterminate choice in opposition to authority;
rather, it is the state of fullest freedom whereby the
moral law has been interiorized and definitively
guides our decision-making. For Simon, the glory
of the autonomous individual is precisely his freedom to reflect on a whole range of means to
achieve his end: happiness.
But this deliberation is not carried on in isolation. As Simon insists, the quest for autonomy is
pursued in community, and the moral law with
which autonomy accords concerns not the isolated

individual, but the person in community. Thus,
autonomy is essentially related to the common
welfare, and to achieve the common welfare
requires political authority. Contrary to the
assumptions and instincts of liberalism, Simon
contends that political authority and personal
autonomy do not in principle conflict but rather
complement one another. Each is necessary for a
healthy polis. Some organ of the community must
choose the means to the common good- those
conditions that allow for the full development of
persons. This, for Simon, is the charge of political
authority, but the exercise of this authority must
promote human development by respecting the
principle of subsidiarity. A democratic form of
government, in Simon's estimation, uniquely facilitates human development on the widest scale.
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Both the governed and the governing in this
schema consider themselves dependent upon each
other and obligated by a higher law, created neither by statesmen nor citizenry. Instantiating the
requirements of this law, borne of divine wisdom
and love, is the task of every democratic citizen.
This seems to me to be the kind of authentic
democracy appreciated by Christian democrats
across the denominational spectrum- a form of
democracy that is consonant with the tradition of
Christian discipleship and which deserves our
commitment as members of an earthly and a heavenly city.f

Jeanne Heffernan teaches in the humanities program

at Villanova University.

law
allegiance to first principles
Frank Colucci
HIS IS A TIME OF TRANSITION ON THE UNITED

T

States Supreme Court, not just in personnel
but also regarding the establishment clause.
Over the past two decades a divided Court has
split the difference concerning government recognition of religious belief. But an issue percolating
in two federal appeals courts, along with the addition of two new Justices, provides a chance for
needed clarity about what the Constitution truly
requires.
The rulings in the two Ten Commandments
cases last June is only the latest example of this
confusion. By a 5--4 vote, the Court affirmed a
longstanding monument on the grounds of the
Texas State Capitol, but by another 5--4 vote it
rejected a more recent display at a courthouse in
McCreary County, Kentucky. These decisions produced a total of ten written opinions, with only
Justice Breyer joining both majorities. In announcing the opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "I
didn't know we had that many people on this
Court."
With these decisions, the Rehnquist Court
continued its constitutional indecision in this area.
In 1989, the Court upheld a county's menorah on
public land while striking down a creche displayed by the same county at another building.
Before that, the Court had invalidated nativity
scenes on government property unless they were
surrounded by secular elements such as a snowman, a talking wishing well, and plastic reindeer.
The most notable opinions in the recent Ten
Commandments cases were those of concurring
and dissenting justices. Breyer explained his split
vote by stating that he could not draw a single formula or test in borderline cases, but had to exercise prudent legal judgment to avoid political divisiveness over religion. Dissenting in the Kentucky
case, Justice Scalia argued that government can
constitutionally favor monotheistic religion over
irreligion because "our national tradition has

resolved that conflict in favor of the majority."
Justice O'Connor voted to invalidate both displays. She criticized Scalia, asking "why would
we trade a system that has served us so well for
one that has served others so poorly?" One might
question whether her endorsement test, which
provided a basis for previous split decisions, really had served us all that well.
As two new members take the seats of
Rehnquist and O'Connor, the Court faces a new
challenge concerning the Pledge of Allegiance.
Edward Myers, a Mennonite father, sued to prevent the daily recitation of the Pledge in the
Loudoun County, Virginia, public school his sons
attend. He claimed teacher-led recitation of the
phrase "under God" in the Pledge violated the
establishment clause. In August 2005, a threejudge panel of the Fourth Circuit unanimously
upheld the Pledge in Loudoun County schools
because it is a patriotic exercise, not a prayer. This
decision conflicts with the rulings of the Ninth
Circuit. In 2002, it upheld a similar challenge
brought by atheist Michael Newdow against his
daughter's California school district. The finding
for Newdow led to great public outrage, and
Congress immediately passed a resolution condemning the decision.
The Supreme Court heard an appeal of
Newdow's case in 2004, yet characteristically
avoided the substantive question. The Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, but a majority of
Justices did so on the narrow ground that
Newdow, a non-custodial parent whose domestic
status was in dispute, lacked legal standing to
bring the suit on behalf of his daughter. Three
Justices-including Rehnquist and O'Connorreached the merits of the case, ruling that recitation of the Pledge in public schools is
constitutional. In the meantime, other California
families represented by Newdow have brought
suit, and in September 2005 a district court judge

found they had standing and reinstated the Ninth
Circuit's 2002 decision striking the pledge.

T

HESE CONFLICTING RULINGS, ALONG WITH A

1992 Seventh Circuit ruling that upheld
recitation of the Pledge in Illinois public
schools, make it likely that the Supreme Court will
finally have to decide this case on its merits. While
politically controversial- and, to some, perhaps
inconsequential- this case provides a welcome
opportunity for the new Roberts Court to clarify
the reach of fundamental constitutional principles.
Against the establishment clause challenge,
the main arguments of Rehnquist and O'Connor
as well as the Fourth Circuit appear quite sound.
It is hard to see how the mere phrase "under God"
constitutes an establishment of religion. After all,
the pledge is not a prayer or religious exercise.
Further, the scope of Newdow's legal activity
seems to bristle with hostility to religion. He first
challenged the very constitutionality of the
pledge-naming Congress and former President
Clinton as co-defendants-then, after losing his
daughter's case in the Supreme Court, filed another lawsuit attempting to block prayer at President
Bush's inauguration. Such arguments arise out of
the tangled web of past Supreme Court doctrines
including the Lemon test, O'Connor's endorsement test, and the metaphor of a wall of separation, high and impregnable.
While every federal court outside the Ninth
Circuit has rightly refused to accept the establishment clause argument, I nevertheless believe the
Supreme Court should strike government-led
recitation of the Pledge in public school classrooms. It should do so not because the pledge
contains a religious element, but because this
recitation violates the basic principles of free
speech and personal liberty the Constitution seeks
to guarantee.
This argument is rooted in the 1943 case West
Virginia v. Barnette, where the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a state requirement
that public school students salute the flag and
recite the pledge. Barnette sued, although the
Court had rejected an earlier challenge just three .
years earlier. The Court reversed itself, finding for
Barnette. While the Court formally reached this
decision on free speech principles, its justification
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transcended the text of the First Amendment and
invoked larger considerations of personal liberty.
As Justice Robert Jackson stated for the majority,
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."
In light of the principles of Barnette, it does not
resolve the constitutional issue to describe the
Pledge of Allegiance as a patriotic exercise and not
a prayer. That resolves establishment clause concerns, but doing so makes us lose sight of what the
Pledge is-an oath of loyalty to the flag, and to the
republic for which it stands. In the public school
context, the recitation of the Pledge, defended as
an exercise in national unity, becomes a loyalty
oath administered to minors and led by government officials. The phrase "under God" is thus
constitutionally irrelevant. Were the phrase
removed-and it was not added until1954, eleven
years after Barnette-the outcome should be no
different.

I

T IS ALSO NOT ENOUGH TO SAY THAT TODAY-

unlike in Barnette-students are free not to
recite the Pledge. Here, invocation of the
Court's establishment clause decisions in the public school context does become relevant. In striking government-organized prayer in the classroom, at graduation exercises, and at high school
football games, the Court has emphasized the
public school context, where minors face pressure
from authority figures and from peers to conform.
State-led recitation of political orthodoxy by
minors in public schools, whether it takes the form
of a civic religion or not, should be just as impermissible as state-led recitation of religious
orthodoxy.
A closer emphasis on coercion would exemplify prudent legal judgment and temper the
excesses of recent establishment clause arguments.
Striking down recitation of the Pledge on free
speech grounds would not require the wholesale
removal of God from public life. Courts could
uphold most government recognition of religion
in public places (an exception: the two-ton Ten
Commandments monument placed in the

Alabama Supreme Court by since-impeached
Chief Justice Roy Moore). They would not have to
remove "under God" from the Pledge, take "In
God We Trust" from currency, or ban legislative
prayers or presidential proclamations of
Thanksgiving. None of these actions establish a
political or religious orthodoxy or compel anyone
to make an unwanted statement.
Focusing on coercion would end the continuing debate over whether such invocations of God
in the public sphere are substantive or merely ceremonial. Further, striking daily recitation of the
Pledge would not drive civic education from public schools. In fact, mere recital of the Pledge likely desensitizes students to the flag and republic
to which we pledge allegiance, and it may well
impede rather than advance discussion about

whether this is truly one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
The constitutional dispute over governmentled recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public
schools affords a chance to clarify unsettled
jurisprudence in two important areas. It would
allow the Court to streamline convoluted establishment clause jurisprudence and reiterate the
ability of government to recognize the religious
beliefs of its citizens. More fundamentally, it provides an ideal opportunity to reaffirm the broad
principles of personal liberty the Constitution was
intended to protect. f

Frank Colucci is assistant professor of political science
at Purdue University Calumet in Hammond, Indiana.

DRIVING LESSON
Once I jumped the curb, confusing the brake
and accelerator; or maybe my parallel parking
approached a calamitous sideswipe. Picture this:
Dad and I sit sunk in our quarrel, losing steam,
as gardens around us undulate shade and light.
When you appear in the rear view mirror,
I am not surprised. This is your street; I brought
you the galleys in March, when you broke your leg.
Poised on the top step, dressed to go out in your blue
patterned blouse I remember from high school English,
you read a letter in your hand.
I ache for that summer. What if I had run down
the sidewalk waving? Would you have been glad
to see me, and Dad, storming there in the front seat,
never really understanding why I chose poetry over
science and safety, would he have said, "Go talk
to your teacher. You might not get this chance again."?
There is no turning back over the road we litter
with those futile tears and lost moments.
His clean carpentry, our front door
with its intricate white panels and little panes
of glass, planed to perfection; and the pure craft
of your poetry, with its neatly stitched seams,
so beautiful and exacting: what are these but the art
of living true? You taught me, both of you, before
you died in the same month of a year still distant
from that wide and leafy day. The faith you had in me!
So fierce I almost could not believe it, squandering myself
in fitful starts and bursts of speed, popping the clutch.
Maybe it was not a good time.
Clearly you had someplace to go (off to ride
camels in Egypt again, as you did one holiday,
or to Machu Pichu, which you wrote me about
later, in your last week); and I, in my girl's life,
had to learn to drive. Standing in front of your
dark red brick house on the comer, probably
(though I can't quite remember) in sight
of your father's roses that you would one .day
write poems about, you did not look up.

Diane G. Scholl
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books
not a tame Lewis
David Weber
Alan Jacobs. The Narnian: The Life and Imagination
of C. 5. Lewis. San Franciso: HarperSanFrancisco,
2005.
EAR THE END OF HIS NEW BIOGRAPHY OF C. 5.
Lewis, Alan Jacobs cites the novelist
Philip Hensher who criticizes the "doctrinaire bullying" in Lewis's Narnia stories, which,
he says, were, "written to corrupt the minds of the
young." He also says, "Let us drop C. S. Lewis and
his ghastly, priggish, half-witted, money-making
drivel about Narnia down the nearest deep hole as
soon as is conveniently possible." Jacobs also
quotes the English author, Philip Pullman, who
thinks Lewis's "supernaturalism" is life-denying
and that the stories are littered with racism,
misogyny, and essentially dishonest. In his view,
"There is no shortage of such nauseating drivel in
Narnia, if you can face it."(307). If "drivel" is
indeed what these critics think of Lewis's stories,
what explains the intense vehemence of these criticisms? Drivel is best ignored. These authors do
not ignore Lewis, but, with their criticism, honor
the force of his ideas and the skill with which he
communicates them. These criticisms recognize

N

What is it about children's stories that make
them better for ethical reflection than the writings
of modern scholars? Jacobs's answer is that children's stories have "the ethical shape of a narrative
world in which obedience to Just Authority brings
happiness and security, while neglect of that same
Authority brings danger and misery" (xvii). Jacobs
quotes G. K. Chesterton who writes that a good
story somehow inflames the imagination so that
we can see that "courage is splendid, that fidelity
is noble, that distressed ladies should be rescued,
and vanquished enemies spared. There are a large
number of cultivated persons who doubt these
maxims of daily life" (123). Modern scholars
debunk these basic ethical sentiments because
they wanted to be left alone to live in a world without a master story, left free to fashion their own
story. Lewis came to doubt the debunkers when he
saw that modernity, being without a story, was not
liberated but unimaginative and inhuman.

O

N E OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PARTS OF

Lewis's story is the near loss of his imagination. Lewis writes in Bluspels and
Flalansferes: A Semantic Nightmare, "I am a ratio-

that this is not a tame Lewis and that his ideas can-

nalist. For me, reason is the natural organ of truth;

not be ignored. Jacobs tells us why this is so.
At the center of these dangerous ideas is
Lewis's imagination and Jacobs's biography aims
to tell the story that "traces the routes of Lewis's
imagination" (ix). Lewis wrote in A Preface to
Paradise Lost that "The great moral which reigns
in Milton is the most universal and most useful
that can be imagined, that Obedience to the will of
God makes men happy and that Disobedience
makes them miserable"(xvi). Lewis goes on to
note that this "dazzlingly simple" idea about the
relationship of obedience to happiness is, at once,
"the commonest of themes" in children's stories
and is roundly missed by "great modern scholars" (xvii).

but imagination is the organ of meaning." To be
rational does not mean what the rationalists of his
time meant. Lewis came to see that to be rational
was to be truthful and meaningful. We need critical reason because knowing the difference
between truth and falsehood matters. We need
imagination because the absurdity and futility of
our lived experience undermines the sense that
our lives and actions have meaning. The third element in Lewis's anthropology is will. C. S. Lewis
scholar Michael Ward maps out Lewis's idea of
the rational human being. Imagine concentric circles with the imagination on the outside ring, critical reason in the next, and the will at the center.
If our will is cut off from critical reason and

informed only by the imaginative, we lose the
ability to decipher the truth among the various
competing but incompatible possibilities floating
in our imaginations. When our will functions
without imagination, we cannot see the meaning
of our choices, actions, and indeed our whole
lives. The story of the near death of Lewis's imagination is really a story about the propoer relationship between the will, the imagination and
the rational.
The Abolition of Man is an extended argument
that provides insights into Lewis's struggle to sustain his imaginative life. Lewis argues that without the imagination (i.e., the organ of meaning)
our moral choices will be guided either by the dry
rational thought of the head or by the emotional
feelings of the gut. When the head is in control, the
will tends toward cold calculation, emptied of the
romance of heroic action. When the gut is in control, we have no way to discern which of the conflicting feelings we ought to follow. We need
"habits of the heart" (xxiii) that can combine the
furious opposites of critical reason and imagination so that our moral choices are truthful and
meaningful. The problem is that these habits of the
heart are under attack by the "bitter, truculent,
skeptical, debunking, and cynical intelligentsia"
who work through the educational system (34).
Lewis thought that the near destruction of his
imagination began with his schooling. In The
Silver Chair, his dislike for modem education is
depicted in a "progressive" school where psychology is the "master science," with "its emphasis on understanding rather that correcting or
punishing errant students, and its belief that children require personal freedom rather than rules if
they are to flourish"(19). In The Lion, The Witch,
and the Wardrobe, Edmund, the one of the four
Pevensie children who eventually betrayed his
brother and sisters, began to go wrong "at that
horrid school'" where he learned to pick on anyone smaller than himself (33-34). Of his own
schooling, Lewis thought it caused "a great
decline in [his] imaginative life" (26). Lewis's
most cherished educational experience was under
the private tutelage of William Kirkpatrick, who,
ironically, abetted the ruin of Lewis's imagination by introducing him to Schopenhauer's pessimistic philosophy. According to Jacobs, a poem
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by A. E. Housman best captures the essence of
this pessimism:
Therefore, since the world has still
Much good, but much less good than ill,
And while the sun and moon endure
Luck's a chance, but trouble's sure,
I'd face it as a wise man would,
And train for ill and not for good (47).
Imagination is the organ of meaning. If one's
life seems meaningless, imagination cannot but
wither. Though Lewis found Schopenhauer
depressing, his pessimism hit home as Lewis came
to the conclusion, "'Nearly all that I loved I
believed to be imaginary; nearly all that I believed
to be real I thought to be grim and meaningless"
(49). Lewis's experience of trench warfare in the
First World War did nothing to dissuade him from
his pessimism. In his poem Spirits in Bondage, written during his convalescence from his war
wounds, Lewis gives poetic voice to his pessimism
as he writes:
The ancient songs they wither as the grass
and waste as doth a garment waxen old,
All poets have been fools who thought to
mould
A monument more durable than brass (76).
The line "poets have been fools" reflects the slow
death of Lewis's imaginative life which was
"unable to resist the combined forces of philosophical pessimism and the horrors of the Great
War" (80). Nor did the end of the war make any
difference. In fact, upon returning to Oxford to
study, Lewis realized the war's "'absolute suspension and waste"' (88). It is then, in 1920, that he
writes, "I am more worried by what goes on inside
me: my imagination seems to have died .. .! go
round and round on the same subjects which are
always those I least want to think about" (100).
This pessimism at least had the positive effect
of bringing Lewis to recognize that, having no
idea about what was "the real Good," he had "'no
business to object to the universe as long as I have
nothing to offer myself-and in that respect we are
all bankrupt"'(101). For a time this bankruptcy
had been a negative fund of "energy that had driven the poems ... in which he was 'defying heaven,'

hurling contempt at the Jailer-God."
"had run out, and in the process his
had been starved" (102). With the
'"poetry' -his imaginative life" (109)
pleted, Lewis was left:

But this too
imagination
loss of his
nearly com-

"kicking, struggling, resentful, and darting his eyes in every direction for a chance
of escape"; had he remained in that state
his ultimate fate would have been that of
the Dwarfs at the end of The Last Battle,
who in the midst of the glorious landscape
huddled together and face each other,
insisting that "rich red wine" is but "dirty
water out of a trough" and a magnificent
feast no more than an old turnip and raw
cabbage leaf. When the children beg
Asian to help them, he tries-the wine
and feast are his efforts-but must conclude, "They will not let us help them.
They have chosen cunning instead of
belief" (134).
Jacobs sees Lewis faced with this decisive either/or
decision between cunning and belief. Without
imagination, cold reason would tum to cunning,
but in order to preserve the imagination he would
have to admit that he was not the author of his
own story.
We know how the story turned out, as Lewis's
conversion has been examined over and over
again, but there is something unique in Jacobs's
retelling of this familiar story. Like any story we
read repeatedly, its goodness is not in the
unknown ending, but in remembering the
unlikely events leading up to the end. Jacobs succeeds in fixing readers in the middle of Lewis's
story by making connections with texts and events
in Lewis's life and with insightful analysis of
Lewis's books and letters. This brings about a
renewed recognition of the angst-ridden struggle
Lewis experienced when caught between cunning
and belief, and a renewed appreciation for the

unlikely event of Lewis's choice of the way of
belief. Lewis thought that a good story had a way
of giving readers a "sense of the story of which
their own lives are a part, of the moving course of
their own action and experience." As Jacobs performs a good retelling of a good story, he brings us
into Lewis's story in a way that lets us think imaginatively about our own either/or experiences and
appreciate better the importance of the wellformed imagination for choosing against cunning
and for belief.
In a letter to his father, Lewis once wrote, "It
will be a comfort to me all my life to know that the
scientist and the materialist have not the last
word .. .It leaves the whole thing rich in possibilities: and if it dashes the shallow optimisms it does
the same for the shallow pessimisms" (120). This
recognition of life's rich possibilities is what Lewis
would come to call joy, which is that consciousness "of a desire which no natural happiness will
satisfy"'(146). If the natural world of modem
rationalism was the whole show, this desire for
joy would only fuel our disenchantment with our
lives. But if it is true, as Tolkien wrote, that "the
legend-makers with their rhyme" pointed to
another reality "of things not found within
recorded time,"(146) then the desire for joy,
makes even our sufferings in a way unimportant.
Until that fulfillment of jo is realized, Lewis saw
the role of poets and storytellers as helpng us
overcome our many disenchantments with
images of a more enchanted world. Lewis once
observed, "When the old poets made some virtue
their theme, they were not teaching but adoring,
and that what we take for the didactic is often the
enchanted" (xxiv). Narnia is neither '"doctrinaire
bullying'" nor drivel, but the imaginative adoration of one saved from the cunning of cold pessimism. If Lewis seems, to his critics, untamed, it
is because he has given us stories that reflect the
truth and beauty that he saw in obeying Asian,
who is not a tame Lion. f

the attic
where is Christmas?
(fi rst published in December 1964)

0. P. Kretzmann
Dear Stephen:
Yesterday as the sun went
down, the maple west of our
house was a riot of gold and red
and brown .. . During the night
the first cold wind came down
from the North, and this morning the tree stood stark and bare
against the hill . .. I looked at it
as the coffee was brewing on
our stove-and I knew it was
time to say something about
Christmas ...
Exactly twenty years have
come and gone since I wrote my
first Christmas letter to your
brother John ... Both John and
Mark have now gone away to
see if Christmas still has a place
on the campus of a great university . . . When dusk comes down
over our house on Christmas
Eve, I hope they may be able to
hear the crying of the Child in
the loudness of our time . . .
Only then and there will they
learn to be faithful and wise in a
heavenly sense . . .
Tonight I remember, too,
that ten years ago, just before
Christmas, you were playing on
the floor before the fire when
you looked up and asked:
"Where is Christmas?" . . . I did
not answer at the time because I
certainly knew that this was a
very hard question .. . You had
put the finger of a little child on
one of the ultimate problems of
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life and time . . . If we always
knew the answer and would
live under its great light, we
would be much happier than
we are now and our world
would be so much better for it.
In one way the answer to
your question is easy enough. . .
Christmas is in every place
where people have heard about
the Baby, the Mother, the cave
and the shepherds running to
their God in the night . . .
Christmas is even in Chicago as
people rush up and down State
Street ... in the carols sung from
the Tribune Tower . . . in the
lonely church bell in the
Chicago Loop as it sounds more
alone on Christmas Eve . . . in
the choirs of eternity chanting ...
in Christmas trees huddled
around the doors of grocery
stores . . . in the stars of
Christmas flaming in their
courses . .. in the Virgin Mother
making the bed of straw . . . in
the quiet sleep of the Christ
Child . ..
Christmas is wherever man
has been and God has come to
forgive . . . The nine tolling
monosyllables, "There was no
room for them in the inn," are
the story of man; and the simple
words, "For God so loved the
world," are the essence of God
. . . Christmas is where people
believe that it is both fact and

faith .. . It is where there is wonder at the folly of men and the
pity of heaven ... It is where
trumpets sound again at dawn .
. . It is where men hear a song
out of the heart of God-no
mortal melody but the divine
symphony of peace and the forgiving of sin ...
Where is Christmas? . . .
When all is said and done it
finally must be in your heart ...
The events of Christmas Eve
and Christmas Night must be
lived again in the hearts of all of
us who believe that in the Child
was the final answer to the troubles and anxieties which disturb
us these days . .. Christmas is a
quiet interior thing which finally only God can see in all its
power and glory . . .
Christmas is also in a
famous cartoon which I saw
just forty years ago . . . There
was a dark, cold, windswept
street and a brilliantly lighted
mansion with holly wreaths in
the windows . . . In the snow
before the house were two
ragged and huddled figures .. .
a mother and her son . . . The
boy is saying to his mother:
"Ah, don't cry Ma, ya singing
swell." . . . Christmas is here,
even here, even in our crying in
the night . . . in the fellowship of
those who bear the marks of
pain .. . f
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